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The Secured Farm Creditor's

Interest In Federal Price Supports:
Policies and Priorities
By

PAUL B. RASOR* AND
JAMES B. WADLEY**

American farmers benefit from a dazzling array of government programs. Many of these programs are designed to raise
artificially the prices farmers receive for certain farm commodities. The techniques vary among the programs, but all are
designed to put money or some other asset into the farmer's
hands, often as a substitute for crops which did not quite make
it to market. Sometimes the government gives the money or
other asset away; sometimes it conditions its largess on receipt
of a specific claim in certain commodities.
The farmer's general financier, whether private lending institution or federal agency, has a stake in the farmer's entitlements under these programs. The recent economic recession has
pushed many farmers into bankruptcy, and these entitlements
are important assets which may be claimed by the trustee or by
the government itself. This Article discusses the operation and
policies of these programs and addresses whether, in light of
these policies, the general financier or crop lender can reach the
farmer's entitlements under the programs and, if so, whether he
can keep them when the farmer files for bankruptcy.
Since the federal support programs are tied to farm commodities or crops, the special rules of Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code or U.C.C.) pertaining to crop
lending are relevant and will be discussed in part I. In part II,
* Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. B. Mus., University of
Michigan 1968; J.D., University of Michigan 1972.
** Professor of Law and Director of the Rural Law Center, Washburn University
School of Law. B.S., M.S., Utah State University 1969; J.D., Tulane University 1972.
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the history, operation and policies of the various support programs are discussed. Part III deals with the interesting question
of whether a special federal priority rule ought to apply to
resolve conflicting claims. Finally, in part IV, we analyze the
priority disputes which arise when the farmer's creditors, the
federal government, the bankruptcy trustee and other assorted
characters all claim rights to the proceeds generated by these
price support programs.

I. THE SPECIAL TREATMENT OF CROP
FINANCING UNDER ARTICLE NnE

Article Nine's treatment of crop financing (and all farm
lending, for that matter) has always been somewhat schizophrenic. This malady stems from the Code's inability to choose
between two fundamentally inconsistent views of the farmer.
One view treats the farmer as the manager of a modern agribusiness, and recognizes that crops are essentially the farmer's
inventory.' For the most part, Article Nine follows this view and
applies to crop lending just as it does to other sorts of inventory
financing. A farmer is free to offer as collateral the wealth
represented by his crops, and the secured lender may protect
2
itself under Article Nine's general scheme.
The alternative view of the farmer is that of a grizzled old
man in bib overalls and straw hat. To the extent it follows this
view, Article Nine is loaded with special, often paternalistic,
rules for farm collateral. This special treatment of farmers is
not unique; indeed, much of agricultural law may be thought of
as a series of exceptions to other rules. 3 But special treatment in
one area does not of itself justify special treatment everywhere.
I "[M]ost farm products would be the farmer's inventory if it were not for the
Code's arbitrary classification of them as farm products." Coogan & Mays, Crop
Financing and Article 9: A Dialogue with ParticularEmphasis on the Problems of
Florida Citrus Crop Financing, IC SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 27.09 (P. Coogan, W. Hogan & D. Vagts eds. 1968). For a general
discussion of the problems of taking security interests in crops, see Meyer, Potential
Problems Connected with the Use of "Crops" as Collateralfor an Article 9 Security
Interest, 1981-82 AcRiC. L.J. 115.
2 See, e.g., UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-102 (scope and policy), 9-105(1)(b)
("goods" defined), 9-401 (filing requirements) (Official Text 1972) [hereinafter cited as
U.C.C.]. All citations are to the 1972 Official Text unless otherwise noted.
I See I J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, AGRICULTURAL LAW § 1.2 (1982).

19851

FEDERAL PRICE SUPPORTS

In this Article we demonstrate that many of Article Nine's

special rules are unjustified and that others create more problems
then they solve.
Preliminarily, it is worth noting that Article Nine contains
no definition of "crops." It is clear enough that the U.C.C.

treats crops as goods, and not as real estate. 4 Although at
common law so-called "fructus naturales," or "natural" crops5
like fruit and nursery stock, were often treated as real estate,
the Code abolishes any lingering distinction between types of

crops. 6 To take a valid security interest in crops, the creditor
7
must comply with Article Nine, not real estate law.

There are four general areas in which Article Nine singles
out crops for special treatment. These are (1) treatment of afteracquired property, (2) method of perfection, (3) treatment of
ordinary course buyers, and (4) certain priority rules.
A.

After-acquired Crops

At common law, a crop mortgage was invalid before plant-

ing. 8 This rule reflected the early treatment of all after-acquired
property clauses.9 In the early twentieth century, however, states
began to enact legislation permitting mortgages on future crops
as long as the crops were planted within a specified time from
the date the crop mortgage was executed. 0 These provisions
found their way into the 1958 and 1962 Official Texts of the

Code as section 9-204(4)(a). Under this section, a farmer could
not offer as collateral crops which did not "become such" within
a year after the security agreement was signed." According to

6

See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(h). See also U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 588-89 (3d ed. 1975).
See U.C.C. § 2-105 & comment 1. For a good definition of crops, see 2 G.

GILMORE, SEcurry INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 863-64 (1965).
See, e.g., United States v. Newcomb, 682 F.2d 758, 760-61 (8th Cir. 1982).
See, e.g., Butt v. Ellett, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 544, 547 (1873); Long v. Hines, 19
P. 796, 797-98 (Kan. 1888); Cole v. Kerr, 26 N.W. 598, 599 (Neb. 1886).
9 See generally Cohen & Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. PA.
L. REv. 635 (1939) and cases cited therein.
,0 See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. § 58-322 (1949) (repealed 1965 when the U.C.C.
was enacted). See generallyNote, Mortgages on Future Cropsas Securityfor Government
Loans, 47 YALE L.J. 98 (1937).
I U.C.C. § 9-204(4)(a) (1962) states: "No security interest attaches under an afteracquired property clause ... to crops which become such more than one year after the
security agreement is executed. .. "
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the drafters, this rule was intended "to protect a necessitous
farmer from encumbering his crops for many years in the fu12
ture.",
As originally conceived, these statutes were enabling, not
restricting. As crop lending became more sophisticated, however,
their effect was to inhibit the farmer's ability to obtain financing
based on his future crops. 13 In its Code incarnation the rule was
silly, since it could be bypassed easily by the simple but clumsy
expedient of writing a new security agreement each year.' 4 Besides, five-year filing was allowed even for crops.' 5 Thus, longterm crop financing was still possible, and this one-year limitation served merely as a snare for the unwary lender. 16 Fortunately, this restriction was removed by the 1972 Official Text,
which is now law in at least thirty-nine juridictions.' 7 In the
treatment of after-acquired collateral, at least, crop lending has
finally caught up with ordinary inventory financing.
B. Method of Perfection
Crops, at least while they are growing or otherwise in the
farmer's possession, are classified as "farm products" under
Article Nine's scheme of categorizing collateral. 8 While these
categories serve several purposes, the most important is to distinguish among methods of perfection. Filing is the most common means of perfection, and this method is normally used
when the collateral is farm products such as crops.' 9 However,
rather than requiring filing in a centralized location, as for

U.C.C. app. § 9-204 (reasons for 1972 change).
,3 See 2 G. GiLMoRE, supra note 6, at § 32.2.
" See, e.g., United States v. Minster Farmers Coop. Exch., Inc., 430 F. Supp.
566, 570 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
11See id.; U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1962).
16 See 430 F. Supp. at 570; In re Bentley, 17 Bankr. 636, 638 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1982) (quoting 5A Benders Commercial Code Service 93.07 (1985).
17 See U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) state correlation tables. Kentucky has
yet
to adopt the 1972 amendments. See Ky. Rev. STAT. ANN. §§ 355.1-101 - 355.10-102
(Bobbs-Merrill 1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
1SSee U.C.C. § 9-109(3).
19 See U.C.C. § 9401. Filing is a permissible method of perfection for all types
of collateral except money and instruments. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1), 9-304(1).
12
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inventory, the Code lumps all farm-based collateral with con20
sumer goods and requires local filing.
One possible justification for this local filing requirement is
the drafters' belief that transactions involving farmers and consumers were "of essentially local interest." ' 2' This treatment seems
anachronistic, especially in light of the growing role of corporate
agribusiness and the shrinking family farm.22 The drafters thought
"sound policy require[d] a state-wide filing system for all [other]
transactions."' Today, it would seem that the same policy should
apply to agricultural transactions. Kansas apparently believes so;
it recently shifted from local to state-wide filing for all farm
collateral. 24 This reflects a trend in both federal25 and state; 6 law
to stop treating farmers like consumers.
A second possible justification for local filing in farm cases
is that farm products like crops have an unavoidable connection
with land, and land interests are always local. 27 On examination,
however, this explanation is also unsound. First, not all farm
products are connected with land - growing crops clearly are;
harvested crops, cows, chickens, fertilizer, feed, milk and eggs
clearly are not. Yet all these are within the category "farm

See U.C.C. § 9-401(1). Each alternative requires central filing for inventory;
the second and third alternatives require local filing for farm collateral. Kentucky's filing
scheme is unique; local filing is required in all cases, and there is no central filing unless
the debtor is a nonresident and has no principal place of business in Kentucky. See KRS
§ 355.9-401(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
21 U.C.C. § 9-401 comment 3.
22 See Looney, Introduction: Agricultural Law in Arkansas, 37 ARK. L. REv. i
(1984); Wadley, Small Farms: The USDA, Rural Communities and Urban Pressures, 21
WAsHBURN

L.J. 478 (1982).

7 U.C.C. § 9-401 comment 4.
14 See 1983 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 345, § I (Supp. 1983).
2 See, e.g., the Truth in Lending Act (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§
1602(h), 1603(1) (1982) by removing agricultural transactions from its general scope).
Federal preemption of state usury laws for business and agricultural loans is another
indication. See Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 511-12, 94 Stat. 161 (1980) (now expired).
1 At least five of the ten states which enacted some version of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code have, since 1980, removed agricultural transactions from the
reach of this law. See 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws, 386, 388 (amending CoLo. Rav. STAT. §§
5-2-104, 5-3-104); 1980 Iowa Acts, ch. 1156, §§ 17-20 (amending IowA CODE § 537.1301);
1981 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 93, § 5 (amending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-1-301); 1981 Me.
Laws, ch. 243 (amending M. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 1-301); 1982 Okla. Sess.
Laws, ch. 335 (amending OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 2-104, 3-104).
2, Real estate interests such as deeds and mortgages are recorded at the local level
under most statutory schemes. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2221 (1983).
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products. ' 2 Second, it is not only farm products for which local
filing is mandated. The rule also covers farm equipment, no
matter how mobile, and proceeds, such as accounts or general
intangibles, arising out of the sale of farm products. 29 These
items appear to lack connection to the land which might justify
local filing.
As noted, growing crops are connected to the land, and the
Code requires reference to the land in the description of growing
crops used as collateral. 30 But this description is merely to help
identify specific crops as collateral; filings for growing crops are
done in the personal property records, 31 not in the real estate
records. This rule recognizes that crops are goods, not real
estate. Filings for other land-based collateral such as fixtures
and minerals, on the other hand, are specifically assigned to 32the
real estate records, precisely because of the land connection. It
is notable that the drafters did not think growing crops are
sufficiently land-based to include them with these other landbased items. Having decided to treat them as goods, it seems
anomalous to require local filing.
All of this would be academic but for the confusion caused
in cases where the collateral has multiple or shifting uses. The
reporters are full of cases, often inconsistent, in which lenders
lost their security (usually to the bankruptcy trustee) because
they guessed wrong about the nature of the collateral and filed
in the wrong place. For example, tractors were held in one case
33
to be business equipment because the debtor was not a farmer.
In another case and under a different test, tractors were held to
be farm equipment because they are normally used in farming
operations. 34 The same problem exists in other farm contexts.
Depending on the jurisdiction, cattle placed in a feed lot may

- See U.C.C. § 9-109(3).
- See U.C.C. § 9-401(I)(a) second & third alternatives.
"oThis is true in the security agreement itself as well as the financing statement.
See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1)(a), 9-402(1).
- See U.C.C. § 9-401(1)(a) second & third alternatives.
32 See U.C.C. § 9-401(1) all alternatives & comment 4.
31 See In re Lieby, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 428, 430-31 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
See also In re Butler, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 596, 598-99 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1980).
, See In re Burgess, 30 Bankr. 364, 366 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983). See also
Sequoia Mach., Inc. v. Jarrett, 410 F.2d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 1969); Citizens Nat'l Bank
v. Sperry Rand Corp., 456 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex. Civ. App.1970).
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remain farm products or may become inventory. 35 Nursery and
landscaping stock have been held to be inventory,3 6 farm prod-

both.38
Classification is obviously difficult. Treatise writers may sug-

ucts,

37

or

gest tests, 39 but these tests are helpful only if the lenders read

them before they lend and, since the treatises disagree, only if
the courts read the same treatises. A statutory filing scheme

should not force a creditor to classify at his peril. The wise
lender can solve the problem by filing everywhere, but this

solution is unnecessarily expensive and cumbersome. The way to
resolve the classification dilemma is either to abolish "farm
products" as a separate category of collateral or to adopt the
same filing scheme for all types of collateral.
C. Ordinary Course Buyers
A third area reflecting Article Nine's confused paternalism
toward farmers is the treatment of ordinary course buyers of

farm products. In inventory cases, Code section 9-307(1) protects
ordinary course buyers by cutting off the rights of secured

creditors under any security interest created by the seller. Farm
products, however, are an exception and the result is that farm-

ers often cannot transfer good title to their crops. 40 This is a
long standing rule; pre-Code cases nearly universally recognized
the priority of the crop lender over the buyer, normally on the

31 Compare Swift & Co. v. Jamestown Nat'l Bank, 426 F.2d 1099, 1102 (8th Cir.
1970) (farm products) with Garden City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. International Cattle Sys.,
32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1207, 1209-10 (D. Kan. 1981) (inventory).
"See In re Heinl's Nursery, Inc., [Transfer Binder] SECUaED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE
(CCH) 52,687 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1975).
37 See In re Houts, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 338, 344 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
31 See In re Frazier, 16 Bankr. 674, 681 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981).
9 See, e.g., B. CLARc, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
ComMERC AL CODE

8.3[l][a] (1980) (suggesting, in equipment cases, that the courts

"focus on the occupational status of the debtor rather than the normal use of the
equipment"); J. WrrE & R. Suminss, UrNroRM COMMERCIAL CODE 944-45 (2d ed.
1980) (suggesting intended use rather than actual use should control).
40 U.C.C. § 9-307(1) provides: "A buyer in ordinary course of business ...
other
than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations takes
free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected
and even though the buyer knows of its existence." See also United States v. McClesky
Mills, Inc., 409 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1969) (buyer of peanut crop from farmer
takes subject to FmHA's security interest); U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
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theory that a filed chattel mortgage constituted constructive notice. 41 Article Nine, following these cases, etched this rule into
statutory granite.
But why create special status for farm lenders? Gilmore
questioned the original rule as one whose "reasons [were] never
precisely articulated. ' 42 Other commentators have had similar
reactions. 43 One could argue that normal buyers of raw farm
products - people like auctioneers, warehousemen, processors,
and the like - have less need for or are less deserving of this
special protection than are normal buyers of inventory, namely
consumers. But the general inventory rule protects all ordinary
course buyers, not just consumers." An additional problem is
created by the possibility that the farm products exception could
go on without end. 45 The ultimate purchaser of a farm product,
therefore, might well be a consumer. This consumer would not
be helped, even if the ex-farm product had become inventory by
the time she bought it, because section 9-307(1) cuts off prior
inventory interests only when they were created by the buyer's
immediate seller. 46 Here, the original security interest was created
long ago by the farmer. It seems that no sale of goods which
were once farm products to anyone will ever cut off the farmer's
secured creditor. This bizarre rile often thwarts market expec47
tations and is, therefore, hard to justify.
Even the Code drafters were not impressed with this rule.
While considering the 1972 revisions, they "seriously questioned
whether the pre-Code practice is still sound under modern conditions." ' 48 However, the drafters were also well aware that the
federal government had become an important, perhaps the most
important, farm lender. Indeed, nearly all of the reported cases

For a collection of cases see Annot., 77 A.L.R. 572 (1932).
2 G. GILMORE, supra note 6, at 707.
41 See, e.g., Note, Security Interests in Growing and Future-Growing Crops under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 IowA L. REv. 1269, 1286-87 (1964) ("the rationale
for this preferential treatment is not clear").
- See U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
41 The security interest can be cut off by failure to refile if crops leave the state.
See U.C.C. § 9-103(1). See also In re Coast Trading Co., 31 Bankr. 670, 673 (Bankr.
D. Or. 1983).
"' See note 40 supra.
7 See A. SCHWARTZ & R. ScoTr, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTONS,
PRINCIPLES AND
POLICiEs 601-02 (1982).
41 U.C.C. app.
B-9.
4'

41
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dealing with crop buyers under section 9-307(1) involve some
federal agency, usually the Farmers Home Administration

(FmHA).4 9 The Article Nine revisors were concerned that a
change in this section would lead to enactment of a special
federal rule or to widespread, nonuniform amendments by the
states.50 As a result, the drafters left the rule alone in the 1972
revisions, and it remains part of the Code nearly everywhere. 5'
D. PriorityRules
A final area of special treatment for crops involves Article

Nine's priority rules. In general, crops and other farm products
are treated like most other collateral for priority purposes. A

security interest, even in crops, is generally good against the
whole world. 2 In addition, unperfected security interests lose

out to certain lien creditors5 3 and to other earlier perfected

security interests.5 4 But, as one might by now expect, there are

some special rules.
Article Nine gives special status to most purchase money

security interests. 5- For example, a purchase money security interest in inventory has priority over previously filed security
interests in the same inventory, as long as certain conditions on
timing and notice are met. 6 Since crops are not "inventory, 57
however, crop lenders do not qualify for this protection.

Section 9-312(4) gives a similar purchase money priority to
all "collateral other than inventory," but it is also doubtful that

49 See, e.g., United States v. McClesky Mills, Inc., 409 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Busing, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1120 (E.D. Ill. 1970); United
States v. Hughes, 340 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Miss. 1972); United States v. Smith, 22
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 502 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
-0 See U.C.C. app. B-9.
" Kentucky has taken a few steps toward protecting the crop buyer by cutting off
security interests in certain tobacco, livestock and racehorses sold at public auction and
in grain and soybeans sold to certain warehouses, unless the secured party gives appropriate written notice. See KRS § 335.9-307 (Cum. Supp. 1982). Cf. N.D. CENT. CODE §
41-09-28 (1983) (U.C.C. § 9-307).
- See U.C.C. § 9-201.
53 See U.C.C. § 9-301(1).
See U.C.C. § 9-312(5).
" See, e.g., G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHiTMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
573-78 (1979) (discussing purchase money mortgages). See also U.C.C. § 9-107.
- See U.C.C. § 9-312(3).
17See U.C.C. § 9-109(3)-(4).
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crop lenders qualify under this provision. For one thing, it is
difficult to picture a purchase money interest in a farmer's crops.
Production loans, for example, are not used for acquisition of
the collateral. In the crop setting, this type of loan is very similar
to a purchase money loan, but, generally, it is not treated the
same.5 8 Perhaps a seed supplier who retained a security interest,
or the mortgagee of an apple orchard, would qualify. No one
seems to have ever argued the point. 59 Section 9-312(4), however,
is available for noncrop farm products such as livestock 0
Another reason section 9-312(4) does not apply to crops is
the existence of section 9-312(2), a special rule relating to crop
production enabling loans. This provision probably grants whatever limited purchase-money-like protection there is in Article
Nine for crop loans. 61 To qualify, the lender must meet three
tests. First, it must give new value to enable crop production
during the current production season. 62 This criterion is easily
met with the production loans given to farmers. Second, the
loan must have been made no earlier than three months before
the crops were planted. 63 This criterion leaves most long-term
financers unprotected. Third, the production lender will only
defeat a prior perfected security interest if the prior interest
"secures obligations due more than six months before the crops
become growing crops." 64 "Due" has been held to mean "past
due," and as a result, the priority exists only as against those
lenders whose loans have been in default for at least six months
prior to planting. 65 This restriction narrows the priority so much
51 Gilmore, too, seems to distinguish between production loans and purchase
money loans. See 2 G. G.MoRE, supra note 6, at § 32.5.
19A quick scan of the U.C.C. Digest and a preliminary search on LEXIS turned

up no cases which discussed a purchase money security interest in crops, either under
U.C.C. § 9-312(4) or elsewhere. In many states, however, statutory provisions will give
priority for these and similar claims even over prior perfected Article 9 interests. See,

e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-203 (threshing liens), 58-218 (seeding and baling), 58-220
(agister's liens).
60See, e.g., United States v. Mid-States Sales Co., 336 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (D.
Neb. 1971). But see In re Smith, 29 Bankr. 690, 694 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (purchase

money priority does not extend to calves).
6,See 2 G.

GILMORE,

supra note 6, at 869 n.4.

- See U.C.C. § 9-312(2).
63 See U.C.C. § 9-312(1).
U.C.C. § 9-312(2).
"6 See

In re Connor, 733 F.2d 523, 525-26 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Minster

Farmers Coop. Exch., 430 F. Supp. 566, 570 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
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that it is rendered almost nonexistent. 66 In one reported Kentucky
case, 67 the production lender was able to state facts which seemed
to qualify it under section 9-312(2). The lender lost, however,
because it filed in the wrong place.
In considering the 1972 revisions, the drafters appeared to
want to change this provision to correspond in some way to the
change in the after-acquired property rule of section 9-204.61 In
the end they failed to do so, although they recognized the section
"is of little practical effect.' '69 Gilmore predicted that section 9312(2) would "take rank as one of the Code's dead letter provisions. "70 He was right. Crop lenders who want to protect
themselves against earlier security interests in the same crop can
do so only by getting subordination agreements, 71 a practice
72
adhered to by the federal government.
But what of Article Nine's treatment of the farmer's entitlements under the various price support programs? Before we can
discuss this issue intelligently, we must describe the programs
themselves and analyze the special federal interests at stake. In
the next two sections of this Article we take up this task.
II.

THE

HISTORY, VARIETY AND PURPOSE

OF GOVERNMENT PRICE SUPPORTS

A.

The Historic Need for Price Supports

Price supports for agricultural commodities are not an exclusively American institution. Indeed, governments in virtually
every major country in the world now attempt to influence the
prices of at least some farm commodities. 7Where intervention
See 2 0. GILMORE, supra note 6, at 870.
United Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Wells, 490 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 1973). This is
the only reported case in which a secured creditor has even come close to complying
with U.C.C. § 9-312(2).
See U.C.C. app. B-7.
67

69Id.
'o

"

2 0. GILMORE, supra note 6, at 870.
Subordination agreements are recognized in U.C.C. § 9-316.

See text accompanying notes 214-17 infra.
For example, in Australia, a grain marketing board pays farmers the difference
between a board-determined price and the world price for that commodity. The European
Community, on the other hand, pays exporters the difference between the support price,
called the intervention price, and the exporter's sales price. In Canada, hog support
prices are calculated on a five-year national average basis and a deficiency payment will
"

71
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in pricing occurs, governments generally are attempting to achieve
one or more of the following objectives: to raise farm-level prices
and farm incomes; to more effectively allocate resources; to
increase self-sufficiency in food and fiber; and to reduce price
74
and income instability.
In this regard, price support programs in the United States
are no exception. For the most part, government programs here
are primarily directed toward reducing price and income instability and toward raising the average level of farm prices and
incomes. 75 These policy objectives predominate both as a result
of economic conditions of the agricultural sector during the
twenties and thirties and as a result of the way agriculture has
been affected by market place supply and demand considera76
tions .
Historically, farming has been beset by so-called "boom and
bust" cycles. 77 These cycles were essentially the result of factors
totally beyond the farmer's control: predictions of record agricultural production drive prices down, consumer preferences for
particular products shift, weather conditions affect the harvest,
political factors remove lucrative markets, and so on. As a result,

be made to bring the current year price up to 90% of the long term average. In addition,
each province may have an additional supplemental plan. For further discussion, see
Why the EC has to Subsidize Exports, PROGRESSIVE FARMER 12 (Nov. 1982); How Some
Countries Subsidize, PROGRESSIVE FARMER 13 (Apr. 1983). See also K. Campbell, National Commodity Stabilization Scheme: Reflections Based on Australian Experience,
INTERNATIONAL EXPLORATIONS OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 55-63 (R. Dixey ed. 1964);
C. Gilason, How Much has the Canadian Wheat Board Cost CanadianFarmers? 52 J.
FARM ECON. 185-96 (1970).
14 See, e.g.,
G. HALLETr, ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY (1968); G. McCRONE, THE ECONOMICS OF SUBSIDIZING AGRICULTURE (1962); R. SCHICKELE, AGRIcULTURAL POLICY: FARM PROGRAMS AND NATIONAL WELFARE (1954); G. SHEPHERD,
AGRICULTURAL PRICE AND INCOME POLICY (1952); V. RUTTAN, AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN
AN AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1969).

71See generally Scher, Catz & Mathews, USDA: Agriculture at the Expense of
Small Farmersand Farmworkers, 7 TOLEDO L. REV. 837 (1976); Wadley, Small Farms:
the USDA, Rural Communities and Urban Pressures, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 478 (1982).
'6See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 363-68 (1943); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 125-29 (1942); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 145 (1940); Fulford v.
Forman, 245 F.2d 145, 149-50 (5th Cir. 1957); Usher v. United States, 146 F.2d 369,
371 (4th Cir. 1944). See also W. RASMUSSEN & G. BAKER, PRICE SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS FROM 1933 THROUGH 1978: A SHORT HISTORY IN ECONOMICS, STATISTICS
AND COOPERATIVE SERVICE, USDA, AGRICULTURE INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 424 (1979).
71 W. RASMUSSEN & G. BAKER, supra note 76; Harkin & Harkin, "Roosevelt to
Reagan" Commodity Programsand the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, 31 DRAKE
L. REV. 499 (1981-82).
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farmers are in a perpetual bind: when they have a good year
and production is up, prices are low; when they have a bad
year, prices are up but supplies are low.
During the 1920s and 1930s the cycle hit an unprecedented
bust. Conditions in the agricultural sector have been described
as "the worst economic-social-political wrenching in history. 7 8
By 1932, net farm income was less than one-third of what it
had been in 1929 and farm prices had dropped more than fifty
percent.79 Prior to this disaster, a number of proposals had been
presented to Congress in an attempt to moderate the effects of
the "boom and bust" cycles.80 Although none of these proposals
were adopted, they did serve as a rallying point for those who
felt the government should assume a responsibility for farm
prices. 8' Perhaps the most widely supported of these proposals,
known as the McNary-Haugen Plan, 82 was introduced in Congress in 1924 by Senator Charles L. McNary of Oregon and
Representative Gilbert N. Haugen of Iowa. This plan would
have provided for the sale abroad of American farm surplus at
world prices, with a distribution of operating costs and losses
among growers through an equilization fee.83 The plan would
have applied to eight basic agricultural commodities: wheat,
corn, cotton, wool, cattle, sheep, swine, and rice. 84 In 1926,
economist Charles L. Stewart of Illinois advanced a proposal
which called for the payment of a bounty on the export of farm
products and for the issuance of negotiable instruments called
debentures which could be used by importers in paying customs
duties. 85 Advocates of this proposal thought farm prices would
be raised by the extent of the bounty. 86 At about the same time,
Senator Lynn J. Fraser of North Dakota introduced a plan
calling for government guaranteed prices reflecting the cost of
production plus a fair profit. 87 Under this proposal, the govern-

7R

W. RAsMUSSEN & G. BAKER, supra note 76, at 1.

79See id.
w Id.
- See id.
See id. at 2.
83 See

id.

- See
" See
'"See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
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ment would have established a federal agricultural marketing
board which would buy ninety percent of the amount of wheat,
corn, and cotton deemed necessary for domestic consumption
and then sell those products at cost of production plus a fair
profit. 8 Finally, in 1929, a Federal Farm Board was established
on the theory that, with federal aid, farm marketing organizations could control the problem of low farm prices by purchasing
89
surplus farm production.
By the early 1930s, two things were clear: if federal efforts
to stem the disastrous decline in farm prices were to succeed,
federal legislation had to be enacted, and efforts to support farm
prices could be successful only to the extent that production
could be affected by the legislation." ° In 1932 the Federal Farm
Board, in a special report to Congress, recommended legislation
which would "provide an effective system for regulating acreage
or quantity sold, or both." 9' The groundwork for production
control had already been laid in a proposal developed in the
mid-1920s which involved making allotments to each producer
equivalent to his proportion of the total crop sold for domestic
use. This "voluntary domestic allotment plan" was embodied in
the first piece of federal farm price support legislation adopted
in the 1930s.92
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193393 (1933 Act) was a
Congressional attempt to stabilize the farm economy and to
relieve the unprecedented economic hardship suffered by farmers
as a result of the Depression. Section 1 of the 1933 Act declared:
The present acute economic emergency being in part the consequence of a severe and increasing disparity between the prices
of agricultural and other commodities, which disparity has
largely destroyed the purchasing power of farmers for industrial products, has broken down the orderly exchange of commodities, and has seriously impaired the agricultural assets
supporting the national credit structure, it is hereby declared
- See id.
sg See id.
o See generally AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION AND CONSERVATION SERVICE, USDA,
WHY FARMa PRoGRAMs? (1979) [hereinafter cited as WHY FMii PROGRAIs?]; W. RAsMUSSEN & G. BAKER, supra note 76; Harkin & Harkin, supra note 77.
11W. RASMUSSEN & G. BAKER, supra note 76, at 3.
92 Id.
91Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31.
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that these conditions in the basic industry of agriculture have
affected transactions in agricultural commodities with a national public interest, have burdened and obstructed the normal
impercurrents of commerce in such commodities, and render
94
ative the immediate enactment of Title I of this Act.
As initially adopted, the 1933 Act gave the Secretary of

Agriculture the authority
(1) to secure voluntary reduction of the acreage in basic crops
through agreements with producers and the use of direct payments for participation in acreage control programs; (2) to
regulate marketing through voluntary agreements with processors, associations of producers and other handlers of agricultural commodities or products; (3) to license processors,
associations of producers and others handling agricultural commodities to eliminate unfair practices or charges; (4) to determine the necessity for and the rate of processing taxes; and
(5) to use the proceeds of taxes and appropriate funds for the
costs of adjustment of operations, for the expansion of markets and for the removal of agricultural surpluses. 9S

The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Butler, 96 declared unconstitutional the processing and floor stock
taxes established by the 1933 Act. Nevertheless, most of the Act
was reenacted in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of
1937 (1937 Act) with an explicit Congressional declaration that
the Act was not intended to regulate production. 97 As reenacted,
the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to promulgate mar-

', Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, § 1, 48 Stat. 31.
91 W. RASMUSSEN & G. BAKER, supra note 76, at 4.
297 U.S. 1 (1936).
See Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246.
Reenacted were the following sections: § 1 (relating to the declaration of emergency),
currently codified at 7 U.S.C. § 601 (1976); § 2 (relating to declaration of policy),
currently codified at 7 U.S.C. § 602 (1976); § 8a(5)-(9) (relating to violations and
enforcement), currently codified at 7 U.S.C. § 608a(5)-(9) (1976); § 8b (relating to
marketing agreements), currently codified at 7 U.S.C. § 608b (1976); § 8c (relating to
orders), currently codified at 7 U.S.C. § 608c (1976 & Supp. III 1979); § 8d (relating to
books and records), currently codified at 7 U.S.C. § 608d (1976); § 8e (relating to
determination of base period), codified as reenacted at 7 U.S.C. § 608e (repealed 1948);
§ 10(a), (b)(2), (c), (f)-(i) (miscellaneous provisions), currently codified at 7 U.S.C. §
610(a), (b)(2), (c), (f)-(i) (1976); § 12(a), (c) (relating to appropriation and expenses),
currently codified at 7 U.S.C. § 612(a), (c) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); § 14 (relating to
separability), currently codified at 7 U.S.C. § 614 (1976).
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keting orders, establish minimum class prices, and regulate milk
handling in designated marketing areas. 98 In 1938, Congress
adopted the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193899 (1938 Act)
which authorized mandatory price support loans on certain nonperishable commodities and continued the voluntary domestic
allotment plan of the 1933 Act. The constitutionality of the 1938
Act was upheld in the landmark case of Wickard v. Filburn.'00
The 1938 Act and the 1937 Act (reenacting portions of the 1933
Act) have continued to constitute the statutory basis for most
of the current major price stabilization and support programs in
operation today.' 0 '
B.

The Economic Need for Price Supports

In its broadest and most basic form, the federal farm price
programs have two objectives: to raise the basic level of farm
incomes and to insure an abundance of food and fiber at reasonable cost. 0 2 It is notable that both objectives are inherently
incompatible. In the case of agricultural commodities, where
most of the price increases occur at intermediate stages because
of the activities of handlers and processors, a rise or reduction
in consumer prices will not always translate into a corresponding
rise or reduction in farm income. 0 3 In such a situation, a policy
to directly promote lower consumer prices would alone invariably do little to enhance, and would most likely depress, farm
income. As a result, the cost reduction policy is combined with
a farm income policy that tends to be expressed in one of two
formats. First, certain programs are directed at the middle-man
handler or processor in a way that guarantees a minimum sale
price to the producer. This is done, for example, under market-

" See Agricultural

Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246.
Ch. 30, 52 Stat. 30 (1938).
1- 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
101Several acts have been adopted since the 1930s which have refined or modified
to some extent the basic program legislation. These include-the Agricultural Act of 1949,
7 U.S.C. §§ 601-24 (1976); the National Wool Act of 1954, 7 U.S.C. §§ 608-24 (1976);
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-213, 94 Stat. 119; and the
Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-98, 96 Stat. 1213.
02 See generally Wadley, supra note 75.
103See generally V. RuI-rAN, supra note 74.
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ing agreements and orders' °4 or through the establishment of a
minimum price that must be paid by the handler to the producer. 051 This price is determined on the basis of what would be
a fair return to the farmer-producer rather than by relative
06
supplies of the particular commodity or by consumer demand.
Second, there are programs designed to make up the difference
between an expected market price and a higher fair return price. 0 7
This is exemplified by the popularly understood grain price
support programs. 0 8 These approaches have the advantage of
allowing for production levels that ensure low consumer prices
while at the same time artificially bolstering farm income.
Price support programs promote both higher farm incomes
and abundant food supplies by separating the income distribution (higher farm income) objectives of federal policy from the
marketing (low consumer prices) objectives.' °9 Deficiency payments are made when the market price fails to reach a specified
target price level." 0 Farm incomes may be increased as a result
of direct government income supplementation, while consumers
are protected from a simultaneous proportionate price increase.
Of equal importance, prices of export crops can be kept competitive in world markets despite assuring higher returns to farmer
producers."' To be effective, however, the "support" (in this
case "target") price must exceed the equilibrium price between

See, e.g., Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-674
(1982). See also Tigner v. State of Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1940); United States v.
Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 542-48 (1939).
,01See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 608c (1982). For further discussion, see I J. JUERGENSMEYER
& J. WADLEY, supra note 3, at 281-356.
- See Bailey Farm Dairy Co. v. Anderson, 157 F.2d 87, 90 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 788 (1946).
,07See AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION & CONSERVATION SERVICE, USDA, ASCS
BACKGROUND INFORMATION No. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ASCS BACKGROUND INFO.
No. 1].
10 See generally 1 AGRICULTURAL LAW 1-74 (J. Davidson ed. 1981); 11 HARL,
AGRICULTURAL LAW §§ 91.04-.06 (1983); I J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note
3, at 245-79.
- See generally V. RuTTAN, supra note 74.
110See I J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 3, at 279.
- If the support price is set too high, however, foreign producers are encouraged
to undersell American farmers, which may actually eliminate foreign markets for American farm commodities.
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supply and demand." 2 Any time such a payment is made, farmers will receive income they would not have had were only
normal market forces at work.
From an economic point of view, the equilibrium point of a
normal supply and demand curve for agricultural products generally will not generate a satisfactory level of income for the
farmer producer." 3 Since the turn of the century, our country
has experienced a period of rapid and staggering growth.1 4
Primarily because the demand for manufactured goods and'services has seemed to expand virtually without limit as incomes
have grown, this growth has generated rising incomes for those
who provide the resources by and through which this growth
has occurred. However, although the growth of supply of agricultural products has kept pace with that in other sectors of the
economy, demand for agricultural products has grown more
slowly than that for manufactured goods and services. This has
been achieved primarily through advancements in agricultural
technology. As a result, it has become fairly commonplace for
farmers to produce far more of certain kinds of agricultural

,1 If the support price is set at or below the equilibrium point, then the equilibrium,
rather than the support price, will prevail. Since the participation in the program is
essentially voluntary on the part of the farmers, if the farmers do not participate it is
unlikely that any effective control over their production could be asserted. Therefore, it
is necessary that the support price be higher than equilibrium in order to induce
participation.
"I This is because demand for agricultural products has historically grown more
slowly than for industrial products and services. On the other hand, supply has remarkably expanded due to technology, invention and innovation. The impact of the slower
growth in demand relative to increasing supplies constantly depresses farm commodity
prices. In addition there has been an incentive for resources to move out of agriculture
and into nonagricultural production activities. This in turn has raised the cost to the
farmer to keep those resources available for farm production use purposes.
,,4 See, e.g., Sustainable Agricultural Systems: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture of the House Comm. on
Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1982) (statement of Kenneth Farrell) [hereinafter
cited as SustainableAgriculturalSystems]. See also HALLErr & GRAHAM, THE ECONOMICS
OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY (1968); Eckstein & Syrquin, A Note on Fluctuationsin Supply
and Farmers' Income, 53 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 331 (1971); R. Krishna, Agricultural
Price Policy and Economic Development, in AORCUrLTURE DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH, 497-540 (H.M. SOUTHWORTH & B.F. JOHNSTON, EDS. 1967); G. McCrone, THE
ECONOMICS OF SuBsIDISINO AGRICULTURE (1962); G. Shepherd, Agricultural Price and
Income Policy, in AGRICULTURAL PRICES (2d ed. 1952); F. Waugh, Does the Consumer
Benefit from Price Instability?, 58 Q.J- EcoN. 602-14 (1944).
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commodities than market demand requires or can absorb,11 5
thereby driving prices downward. Farm policy makers are convinced, therefore, that if chronic low farm income is to be raised,
prices for farm commodities must be artificially supported at a
level above the equilibrium point established by the market
forces of supply and demand.11 6 This objective has generally
been pursued through the combined impacts of (1) programs
designed to pay directly to the farmer the difference between the
equilibrium price and the higher, more acceptable price, (2)
programs which are designed to induce the farmer to reduce his
production so that supply more closely approximates demand,
and (3) programs which are designed to remove farm commodities temporarily or permanently from the market place.
C.

Types of Current Price Support Programs

Since the early 1930s, a variety of different approaches has
been used by the federal government to bolster farm prices. As
the program is currently administered, three types of price supports may be identified. These include postharvest loans, direct
commodity purchases and direct payments.
1. Loans
For commodities within the jurisdiction of the Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) - for example
feed and food grains, oil seeds, oils, fibers," 7 manufactured

" In many cases, the commodities most frequently overproduced are also commodities that store well for a protracted period. Thus, if demand does not equal supply
in a given year, the surplus may be carried over to succeeding years, further compounding
the problem.
116Debate over the proposed 1985 farm bill has indicated that many policy makers
are becoming convinced that a substantial move toward a more market ordered farm
economy is desirable. See "From Washington," Doane's Agricultural Report, Dec. 14,
1984.
As a result, much of the current proposal is designed to gradually phase out many
of the programs which have been in place since the late 1930s. See Special Report: The
Adminisliation's 1985 Farm Bill, Doane's Agricultural Report (1985).
,17Feed grains include corn, grain sorghum, barley and oats. Food grains include
wheat, rye and rice. Oil seeds and oils include flax seed, cottonseed, soybeans, tung nuts
and occasionally sunflowers. Fibers include wool, mohair, upland cotton and extra long
staple cotton. See generally AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION & CONSERVATION SERVICE,

USDA, ASCS BACKGROUND INFO. No. 1 (1975).
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milk, honey, gum navel stores, tobacco, peanuts and dry edible
beans - the primary price support mechanism is the postproduction loan.' 8 Although administered by the ASCS, postproduction loans to producers are made through the Commodity
Credit Corporation" 9 (CCC) once the particular commodity is
placed in an approved storage facility.' 20 The amount of the loan
is designed to reflect a price level which the Secretary of Agriculture or Congress has determined represents an acceptable
2
return to the farmer.' '
There are two basic loan programs: regular loans and reserve
loans.1 22 Regular loans are made at the national loan rate and
are of nine months' duration. 2 These loans may be repaid by
the farmer at any time prior to the final maturity date of the
loan by paying to the CCC the outstanding principal plus any
interest that has accrued.' 24 This enables the farmer to dispose
of his commodity during the loan period. Reserve loans, on the
other hand, involve a somewhat different situation. Reserve
loans are made to producers at generally the same rate as regular
loans but are for a much longer period-generally three years.'21
This longer period is designed to keep the grain off the market
until such time as normal market forces drive prices to or above
a level at which the farmer vill be deemed to receive a fair
return for his product. Thus, in contrast to regular loans, farmIS See id. at 6.
n9 The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) was created by Exec. Order No.
6340. For a brief synopsis of the early legislative history of the Commodity Credit
Corporation, see 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2138, 2141-47. See also the
Commodity Credit Corp. Charter Act, 14 U.S.C. § 714 (1982). For general background,
see 1 J. JtUERGENSM YER & J. WADLEY, supra note 3, at 253-64. For a discussion of the
role of the CCC with respect to stored grain, see Hamilton & Looney, Federaland State
Regulation of Grain Warehouses and Grain Warehouse Bankruptcy, 27 S.D.L. Ray. 334
(1982). See also 11 HARL, supra note 108, at §§ 91.04-.06; 1 AGRICULTURAL LAW, supra
note 108, at 1-74; AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION AND CONSERVATION SERVicE, USDA,
ASCS BACKGROUND INFOR. No. 1 (Oct. 1975), ASCS BACKGROUND INFO. No. 2 (Mar.
1976).
,20See ASCS BACKGROUND INTo. No. 4, at 3 (May 1976).
321 See WHY FARM PROGRAMS?, supra note 90. See generally I J. JUERGENSMEYER
& J. WADLEY, supra note 3, at 245-79.
'2
USDA ASCS COMMODITY FACT SHEET, WHEAT (1983) [hereinafter cited as FACT

SHEET].
123

See id.

124

See id.

2

See id.
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ers are generally not free to dispose of their commodities during
the loan period. However, when the average national market
price reaches a particular level (currently 125% of the national
loan rate) and remains there for a specified period (currently
five days), the commodity is released from its reserve status and
the farmer may sell the commodity and repay his loan. 26 If the
national market price drops below the "release price," the unsold commodity will be returned to reserve status and kept off
the market. 2 7 In addition, if the national average market price
reaches and remains at a generally higher level, the loan may be
called and the farmer will be forced to repay the loan. 28 If this
occurs, the farmer is completely free to dispose of the commodity in the marketplace.
A notable feature of both of these loans is that they are
nonrecourse in nature. That is, the producers are not personally
obligated to bear the loss resulting from any decline in the
market price below the national loan rate. For example, if at
the end of the regular nine-month loan period the national
market price for the commodity has not reached the national
loan level, the CCC may take title to the commodity as full
payment of the loan and interest charges. Similarly, if at the
end of the reserve contract the market prices have not reached
commodity to the
the "release" level, producers can deliver the
129
CCC and discharge their obligation in full.
Both loan programs may work in combination. At the end
of the regular loan period, if the market price does not exceed
the loan price, the crop may be eligible for entry into the farmerowned reserve program. 30 If at the end of the reserve period the
market price still has not reached the release level, the grain may
be forfeited to satisfy the loan.13 ' It is thus possible for the
commodity to be held off the market for a fairly protracted
period and ultimately not even be sold by the farmer. In addition, if the grain, encumbered by a prior lien, is forfeited to the

id.
id.
t28See id.
-6 See
127 See

129Adjustments for both quantity and quality may be made by the CCC at time

of forfeiture. I J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 3, at 277.
'0 See FACT SHEET, supra note 122.
1' See id.
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CCC, it may not be available to the creditor in the event of a
32
default. 1
2.

Purchases

Commodity purchases make up the second major price support mechanism. In most cases, the producer must apply at the
ASCS county office for the option of selling a quantity of his
commodity to the CCC. 13 3 In the case of grains, however, purchases will be made as a result of CCC agreements with the
producer. 134 In other situations - for example, manufactured
milk products - the CCC is obligated by law to purchase
commodities in an effort to reduce supplies and thereby generate
higher prices. 135 The price paid for the commodity is generally
established by regulation, and the CCC will purchase, up to the
maximum eligible under the program, whatever quantity a producer wishes to sell. 136 Purchases have served as a major price
support mechanism for milk, honey and grains. 137 As in the case
of loans, grain that is subject to prior security interests may be
sold to the CCC.138 This raises the issue as to whether the
collateral may have been removed from the reach of the creditor.
We discuss this issue in part IV, below.
3.

Direct payments

With certain specific commodities, government price support
is achieved through direct payments to individual producers. 139
For wool and mohair, direct payments may be made to the
producer in amounts which, "in combination with producer
marketing returns, are designed to bring the producer's total
112The normal way this matter is resolved is through the use of subordination
agreements. This situation is forced somewhat by the impact of the United States v.
Kimbell Foods Inc. decision. See text accompanying notes 188-230 infra.
...I J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 3, at 279.
'34
See id. at 278.
,"I See id. at 336.
136

See id. at 279.
id.

137See

,31In most cases, the CCC will require a lien waiver from the prior lender before
it will make the postharvest loan to the farmer and accept the grain as collateral. The
CCC currently uses Form CCC-679.
31 See 1 J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 3, at 279.
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return up to the intended support level." 1 40 For milk, fruits,
nuts and vegetables, the Secretary of Agriculture will establish a
minimum price that handlers must pay to the producers by
marketing agreement or marketing order. For some other commodities, a price may be paid to the farmer for certain kinds of
losses.' 4 ' Finally, for most feed and food grains, the method of
support is through what is called deficiency payments. 4 2 These
payments essentially make up the difference between the national
average market price and a higher "target price" set by the
Secretary of Agriculture.143 The "target price" is seen as a price
14
level which will assure the farmer a fair return for his product. Y
However, it is only when the national average market price
received by farmers for the first five months of the marketing
year falls below the established target price that deficiency payments may be made.' 45 Deficiency payments are computed by
multiplying the payment rate by the farm's established yield by
the number of acres planted for harvest. 46 This figure may then
be multiplied by any applicable allocation factor. 47 These payments present a different kind of Article Nine question. With
direct payments, the Article Nine issue is whether the creditor
has any claim to this "extra" money and, if so, on what theory.
This question is discussed below in part IV.
A current variation of the direct payment program is found
in the Payment In Kind (PIK) program. 4 8 Here, the farmer is

140Id.
'"Indemnity

payments may be made to dairy program participants for milk received from the market or for cows producing the milk, because of contamination by
pesticides and other harmful substances. A similar program is available to beekeepers
who, through no fault of their own, suffer pesticide losses to their hives. See AGRICULTUREAL STABILIZATION & CONSERVATION SERVICE, USDA, ASCS BACKGROUND INFO. No.
5, at 5 (Nov. 1979).
"I See generally 1 J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 3, at 279.
143

See generally id.

See id. at 267.
See id. at 279.
See id.
147See Id.
'4 The basic legislative authority for Payment in Kind (PIK) is the Agriculture and
Food Act of 1981, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982 and the Commodity
Credit Corporation Charter Act. Nevertheless, the PIK program is not as new as might
appear from all the publicity it has received. Indeed, this type of approach has been
used to dispose of some surpluses since the 1930s. See Staff Report: An Amazing
Development, PROGRESSIVE FARMER 15-16 (Feb. 1983). Arguably, the Secretary of Agriculture has long had the authority with or without congressional approval to implement
such a program.
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given a quantity of grain, already harvested and in storage, in
149
exchange for not planting all or a portion of his present acreage.
As the program is currently structured, the farmer is required
either to reduce his acreage base between ten and thirty percent
in order to participate in the regular PIK program or to retire
his entire acreage on a bid basis.'50 To participate, the farmer
signs a contract which entitles him to a quantity of grain equal
to eighty percent of his normal yield for corn, sorghum, cotton
and rice or to ninety-five percent of his normal yield for winter
and spring wheat.' 5' In return, the farmer promises to reduce
his acreage by the stipulated amount. The contract provides for
liquidated damages if the farmer does not comply with his
obligation. Payment under the program is in the form of a
certificate, redeemable after the first day of the marketing year
for the particular commodity. This certificate, however, has
limited assignability. Once the farmer accepts ownership of the
PIK grain, he becomes responsible for marketing that grain. The
government will pay storage costs on the grain for five months,
giving the farmer some time in which to make his marketing
decisions. If the farmer had grain in a reserve or regular loan
program, he receives those stocks back as PIK grain and the
loan is liquidated. If the farmer does not have grain under a
loan program, grain will be supplied from somewhere else. Although price support programs sometimes operate in tandem, in
this case the farmer is not able to get a CCC loan or reserve
loan on the PIK grain. 5 2 The principal Article Nine problem
here is whether the secured creditor can claim an interest in the
PIK grain. This issue, too, is discussed in part IV of this Article.
Creditors may view farmers as more attractive loan applicants because of these government support programs. However,

149 See generally J. Bickers, Now A Chance to get Back in the Black, PROGRESSIVE
FARMER 17 (Mar. 1983); J. Suber, PIK Effects Spread, Kansas RFD; Topeka CapitalJournal, Apr. 8, 1983, at 9, col, 4.
10 See AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION AND CONSERVATION SERVICE, USDA, ASCS
COMMODITY FACT SHEET: FEED GRArNs, SUMMARY OF 1983 SUPPORT PROGRAM AND
RELATED INFORMATION (June 1983). The popularity of this program coupled with devastating weather conditions so extensively depleted government grain reserves that for
1984 the PIK program was not extended for feed grains.
i See id.
2 See id.
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two additional observations about price supports are helpful in
analyzing such lending decisions.
First, unless a price support program is mandated by statute,'53 the Secretary of Agriculture has considerable discretion in
determining or approving the amounts, terms and conditions of
price support programs. Section 401(b) of title V of the Agricultural Act of 19495 4 identifies the factors that must be considered by the Secretary in determining whether a price support
program should be implemented for a specific commodity. These
factors include: (1) the supply of the commodity in relation to
the demand; (2) the price levels at which other commodities are
being supported and, in the case of feed grains, the feed values
of each grain in relation to corn; (3) the availability of funds;
(4) the perishability of the commodity; (5) the importance of the
commodity to agriculture and the national economy; (6) the
ability to dispose of stocks acquired through a price support
operation; (7) the need to offset temporary losses of export
markets; and (8) the ability and willingness of producers to keep
supplies in line with demand. These same factors'55 must be
considered by the Secretary in determining the level of support
1 56
even in statutorily mandated programs.
Second, Congress has established a specific support range or
level for many, but not all, farm commodities. 57 For other
commodities, it is the responsibility of the Secretary to determine
the support rate.'-8 Although legislation may establish a range
within which support rates may be set, the Secretary is generally
authorized to increase support levels where it is determined, after
a public hearing, that increased support is necessary in order
"to prevent or alleviate a shortage in the supply of any agricul-

'

The Agriculture Act of 1949, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1982), requires price

support for the following basic commodities: extra long staple cotton, peanuts, rice and
tobacco; loans and purchases for wheat; loans for upland cotton; and payments (under
certain conditions) for corn, wheat and upland cotton. Price support is also mandated
for the following designated nonbasic commodities: tung nuts, honey, milk, barley, rye
and grain sorghum. The National Wool Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 690, 68 Stat. 910,
requires price support for wool and mohair.
"I See 7 U.S.C. § 1421b (1982).
' 7 U.S.C. § 1421b.
"- 7 U.S.C. § 1421b.
"'

See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1444 (1982) (cotton price support levels).
See 7 U.S.C. § 1421(b) (1982).
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tural commodity essential to the national welfare' ' '59 or "to
increase or maintain the production of any agricultural commodity in the interest of national security."' 6 Adjustments in
specific support levels may be made for differences such as
grade, type, quality and location,' 6' or may result from the
approval of marketing quotas by producers of specific commodities. 62
D.

Limited Nature of Price Supports

To deal adequately with a creditor's expectation interest in
the payments, it is necessary to understand some important
limitations. It is a popular misconception that government price
support programs result in "free money" or ensure a profit for
all farmers. However, the support programs with which this
Article is concerned affect commodities which account for approximately only one-half the cash receipts of farmers in the
United States.' 6 3 The prices of commodities which account for
the remaining farm receipts are influenced to some extent by
these price support programs but are not directly supported in
the same fashion. Thus, despite the popular feeling that governmental price support programs constitute the entire national
farm program, not every farmer is involved in or affected by
these programs.
Not only do price support programs not include all farm
commodities, but even where programs are established not every
farmer producing that commodity will be covered by the program. The price support programs considered by this Article are
essentially voluntary in nature, and the individual farmer may
elect to participate or not. '6 Despite the false impressions created
by the landmark case of Wickard v. Filburn, 65 in which a
penalty imposed on a farmer for raising grain in excess of an

, 7 U.S.C. § 1422 (1982).
"6 7 U.S.C. § 1422.

See 7 U.S.C. § 1423 (1982).
See 7 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982).
6 These commodities include wheat, corn, peanuts, rice, tobacco, wool and mohair, upland and extra long staple cotton, honey, barley, oats, rye, sorghums, manufactured milk, flax, soybeans, gum naval stores, sunflowers, sugarbeets, sugar cane and
dry edible beans. See I J.JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 3, at 249.
16.

"

16

See generally id. at 245-79.

317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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imposed quota was upheld by the Supreme Court, government
price support programs are not mandatory in nature. On the
contrary, while a farmer must meet certain criteria before he
will be allowed to participate in price support programs, 166 the
decision to participate is entirely voluntary. Typically, in order
to qualify for participation, the farmer must agree to reduce or
at least not expand his planted acreage or he must agree to keep
a portion of his crop out of the market place for a period of
time. 67 Therefore, it is clearly inaccurate to characterize price
support programs as "free money" to the farmer.
Further, statutes authorize price support programs for many,
but not all, farm commodities plagued by problems of overproduction. This Article focuses upon those programs popularly
understood as price supports - namely, programs affecting only
the following commodities: corn, peanuts, rice, tobacco, mohair,
upland and extra long staple cotton, honey, barley, oats, rye,
sorghums, milk and its products, flax, soybeans, gum navel
stores, sunflowers, sugar beets and sugar cane. As noted above,
this comprises only about half of current domestic farm pro8
duction. 16

Finally, Congress has established limits on the amount of
price support money that may be received by an individual

farmer.

69

This is significant because, in determining whether to

establish a price support program, little or no direct considera-

tion is given to whether current market price actually reflects
true costs of production or the amount of money a farmer
"needs." In many cases, the cost of producing a commodity
may well exceed the price that commodity would bring in the
market place. Thus, even though the amount permitted an individual farmer may be substantial, it may not be enough to
ensure that the farmer breaks even with respect to the production

of certain commodity. Hence, price support programs do not
guarantee a profit to farmers.
E.

Eligibilityfor Price Support Payments

Whether a specific farmer is entitled to payments is also a
variable to consider in addressing creditor expectation. Eligibility
"61
See 1 J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 3, at 273-76.

See id.
'1 See id. at 245-75.
167

16 See 7 C.F.R. pt. 795 (1984) (payment limitation). See also 7 U.S.C. §§ 1307-08
(1982).
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for price support payments may be conditioned upon compliance
with legislative requirements or upon conditions established by
the Secretary. 170 In recent years, there has been a tendency to
link-participation in price support programs to participation in
specific production adjustment programs. Where this occurs, one
of several commonly used production adjustment programs will
7
be implemented as part of the total price support program.' '
These programs are authorized by federal legislation 72 and include cropland set-aside programs, marketing quotas and paid
diversions. Because of the nature of the criteria, the farmer is
not always eligible to participate in these programs.
1. Set-asides
Set-aside programs' 73 are essentially acreage reduction programs in which participating farmers withhold from production
a number of acres-usually measured as a fraction of the acres
normally planted for harvest. In addition, the farmer will generally be obligated to plant an approved cover vegetation or use
an approved conservation practice on those idled acres to control
wind and water erosion. Additionally, producers may be prohibited from offsetting reduced production on a participating farm
by increasing production on a nonparticipating farm for crops
covered by the set-aside provisions. As a general rule, participation in set-aside programs is voluntary and no direct compensation is paid to the farmer for not planting the idled acreage.
To encourage farmers to participate, the set-aside requirement
is generally designed so that the reduced acreage will result in
reduced total production, which in turn will have a positive

1'0 See I J. JUERGENSMEYER

& J.

WADLEY,

supra note 3, at 245-75.

171See id.
172

See Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-24 (1976); Price Supports of

Agricultural Commodities, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1421-50 (1982). For further discussion, see 11
HARL, supra note 108, at §§ 91.04-.06; I J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note
3, at 273-76.
"I See, e.g., Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, tits. III & XI, Pub. 1. Nos. 97-98,
95 Stat. 1213. See generally 1 J. JURGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 3, at 273-75;
USDA LOAN, PURCHASE AND PAYMENT PROGRAMS, ASCS BACKGROUND INFO. No. 5
(1979)[hereinafter cited as LPP PROGRAMS]; ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, USDA HisTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, 1933-84, BACKGROUND FOR 1985 FARM LEGISLATION, AGRICULTURAL INFO. BULLETIN No. 485
(1984)[hereinafter cited as Economic Research Service].
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impact by increasing commodity prices. As a result, lower direct
payments will be required under the price support programs and
higher farm incomes will be realized. Conceivably, a creditor
could insist on participation as a prerequisite to the loan. However, mere participation does not guarantee a price support
payment; it merely determines eligibility. Market forces will determine whether an actual payment is to be made.
2.

PaidDiversions

A paid diversion program differs from a set-aside program
in that farmers are induced to take acreage out of designated
crop production in exchange for a direct payment. 74 In most
cases, this payment will be calculated on the basis of the established farm yield multiplied by the acreage diverted and further
multiplied by the payment per unit amount. Conceptually, the
paid diversion program is designed to accomplish the same objectives as set-asides, though at greater cost to the government.
As with set-asides, the farmer will generally be required to use
the land idled under the program in an approved, noncropproducing manner. An interesting question, discussed below, is
whether the Article Nine lender could reach the diversion payment itself as additional collateral.
3.

Acreage Allotments

With respect to certain commodities - such as extra long
staple cotton, rice, peanuts and tobacco - the total desired
annual production of the commodity has been divided among
farmers on an individual basis predicated both upon the farm's
past history of production of these crops and upon other factors. 175 Participation in the price support programs is further
conditioned upon the producer's harvesting within the acreage
allotments for the particular commodity set for his farm. This
will artificially reduce the farmer's production and possibly reduce the size of the lender's expected collateral. As a result, the
lender may wish that the farmer not participate in the program.
Even if a specific program is not in force, or if the farmer elects

See 1 J. JURGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 3, at 275-76.
"I See id. at 276. See also LPP PROGRAMS, supra note 173.
',4
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not to participate, the farmer may still be required to confine
production to his normal acreage for that commodity in order
176
to maintain eligibility to participate in programs in future years.
Thus, participation in government price support programs
may require the farmer to give up some of his control over
planting decisions. This suggests that, from the perspective of
the government, it is more important that total national production be aligned with the demand for agricultural products than
for individual farmers to realize higher incomes. It appears that
this larger national interest would be jeopardized if farmers
decide not to participate in the programs. This decision might
occur if farmers see the farm lender, rather than themselves, as
the primary beneficiary of the program (for example, where the
lender is too readily given access to the support payments) or if
they feel the lender is dictating their participation decisions.
F. Characterizationof Payments from the Perspective of Price
Support Program Purposes and Objectives
To determine creditor entitlement to price support payments,
it is necessary to characterize the payments according to U.C.C.
criteria. The treatment this characterization produces may or
may not be consistent with price support policies. Thus, it may
be helpful to understand whether - as a matter of price support
(as opposed to U.C.C.) policy - supports are considered as a
return for the disposition of the crop, as a substitute for a crop
that would otherwise have been raised, or as something entirely
distinct from the actual harvested crop.
There is a common perception that, because most so-called
price support programs are frequently linked with production
adjustment or acreage reduction requirements, the price support
payment represents a return or substitute for the "lost" production. From a price support program perspective, however, this
is often not the case. With CCC loans, the commodity is pledged
as security for the loan, the amount of which is calculated in
reference to an expected, above normal, market price. 177 If the
market price actually reaches the loan level, a better than normal
return will be assured in the sale by the farmer after the loan is

176

'"

See 7 C.F.R. § 713.8, pt. 792 (1976).
See ECONoMIc RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 173.

1985]

FEDERAL PRICE SUPPORTS

paid off and the commodity redeemed. Alternatively, if the
market does not reach the loan rate and the commodity is
forfeited to the CCC to cancel the loan, the farmer has also
been guaranteed a "profit" above that which normal market
prices would guarantee. Thus, this support of farm income levels
is consistent with both basic price support policy objectives:
adequate supplies and a fair return. However, to accomplish
this, no additional compensation is paid with respect to any
unharvested or unplanted crops. The same is essentially true
with reserve loans. Further, until it is determined whether the
loan is to be repaid or the grain is to be forfeited, it is also
impossible to say a "sale" has occurred so as to characterize
the loan as compensation for the disposition of the crop.
Similarly, with deficiency payments, the amount paid to the
farmer represents a differential between the established target
prices and the higher of the national average market prices and
the loan level.' 78 The payments thus reflect actual sales only
insofar as those sales have any bearing on average national
market prices. The target prices are not calculated on a farmerby-farmer basis; nor are the deficiency payments designed to
make up the difference between the government established target price and what a particular farmer actually gets when the
grain is sold. Payments to an individual farmer are, in a sense,
based on the producer's share of the national program acreage
rather than on his share of production or sales. 179 National
program acreage, in turn, represents the number of harvested
acres necessary to meet domestic and export needs 0 and to
assure an acceptable level of carryover stocks. Again, payment
is not made to reflect production loss due to out-of-production
acres.
Incentive payments for wool and mohair are based on
amounts needed to bring the average return received by all

,7SSee Economic Research Service, supra note 173; FACT SHEET, supra note 122.
' There is a $50,000 cap on the amount of price support payments an individual

farmer may receive. See 7 U.S.C. § 1308(1) (Supp. 1985). See also Martin v. Bergland,
639 F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1981) (regulation considering husband and wife to be a single

person for purposes of the payment limitation held not violative of equal protection or
due process).
110See Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, USDA ASCS Commodity Fact Sheet: Wheat (Summary of 1983 Support Program and Related Information)
(June 1983); 1 J. JURGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 3, at 273-279.
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producers up to the support level.' 8' With these commodities,
because the relevant percentage is applied to the producer's net
proceeds from sales, the producer who gets a higher sales price
actually gets a higher total income. The incentive feature is seen
as encouraging improvement in quality and marketing and clearly
does not compensate for lost production.
Finally, in the case of direct purchases, it is clear that the
government price paid is calculated on the basis of the actual
quantity sold,8 2 not on what the individual farmer might have
sold had the entire acreage been planted. Although this payment
represents income to the farmer and may be considered as property in his hands, it is not an exact substitute for crops that
would otherwise have been raised nor is it necessarily, except
for the direct purchase situation, part of the "return" for crops
actually sold. On the other hand there are several programs
which provide payments as a substitute for lost production. First,
with disaster payments'8 3 (which are currently not a part of the
farm price program) and crop insurance proceeds' 4 (which are
designed to replace the phased out disaster program), the payment does represent a return for a crop not harvested or planted.
Similarly, an indemnity payment, which has been part of the
dairy program, may be made to farmers for milk removed from
the market (or for cows producing such milk) because of contamination with pesticides or other harmful substances. 8 5 Indemnity payments can also be made to beekeepers for similar
losses.'8 6 In either case, the payment represents "lost" production.
When a paid diversion program is in effect, the farmer is
induced through a direct payment to remove land from production. Because it is calculated and paid on a per bushel basis for
the otherwise expected yield from the diverted acreage, this
payment may be viewed as compensation for lost production.

I See. e.g.,

Agricultural and Food Act of 1981 tit. II, Pub. L. No. 97-98, 95 Stat.

1213.
,82 See USDA ACQUISITION AND DISPOSAL OF FARM COMMODITIES BY CCC, ASCS
BACKGROUND INFO. No. 3 (1975). See also Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, §§ 503,

1103, Pub. L. No. 97-98, 95 Stat. 1213; 7 U.S.C. § 1427 (1982).
82 See LPP PROGRAMS, supra note 173, at 4.
I8. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1520 (1970).
'g LPP PROGRAMS, supra note 173, at 5.
186

See id.
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PIK payments are similar. There, instead of cash, the farmer is
given a quantity of the commodity equivalent to that represented
by the acreage not planted.
In these latter cases, the payment should be treated as the
equivalent of a crop. From a property point of view, the farmer's
interest in the payment should be treated as the equivalent of a
profit or rent from the land. In determining whether the payments are to be treated as the equivalent of a crop for Article
Nine purposes, however, courts rarely have made these distinctions and have instead treated them as crop substitutes or proceeds. The Article Nine framework, however, knows nothing of
"rents and profits," and the proceeds approach may be necessary. Part IV discusses the problems courts have had sorting out
proceeds issues.
III.

WHAT LAW APPLIES?-A LOOK BEYOND

United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.
Until recently, there has been some uncertainty as to whether
a government security interest-such as one arising from a FmHA
loan or from a CCC price support loan - would prevail over
private liens and, if so, whether priority would be determined
on the basis of federal or state law.' 87 The recent decision of
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.'85 is generally understood
as permitting nondiscriminatory state law, such as Article Nine
of the U.C.C. to be used in the absence of an applicable federal
statute setting relevant priorities.' 89 Several cases have applied
Article Nine to the question of whether a perfected Article Nine
security interest attaches to a farmer's interests in PIK grain.' 9°
However, a careful consideration of Kimbell Foods suggests that
result may not be inevitable.
In Kimbell Foods the Court considered the relative priority
of liens arising from federal - Small Business Administration

I"See, e.g., Comment, The FmHA Security Interest:Are Remedies Divisablefrom
Perfection and Priority?,24 S.D.L. REv. 753 (1979).
-- 440 U.S. 715 (1979). Kimbell Foods was the consolidation of two cases. The
first case addressed the priority of loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration. The second case, styled below as United States v. Crittenden Tractor Co. addressed
the same issue where the Farmer's Home Administration was the guarantor.
I" See 440 U.S. at 740.
110For a discussion of these cases, see text beginning with note 326 infra.

[Vol. 73

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

(SBA) and FmHA - loan programs and private liens perfected
under state versions of the U.C.C. In the case before the Court
involving an SBA loan, 191 a private security interest was created
prior to the creation of a federal lien. 192 After the federal loan
was made, the private lender advanced additional money under
a standard "dragnet" clause in the original agreement which
provided that the collateral would secure future advances. 193 Both
the federal and private security interests were perfected under
the state U.C.C. 194 In the FmHA case 9s a government loan was
secured by an interest in the borrower's crop and farm equipment. 96 The competing private lien arose from the borrower's
nonpayment for subsequent repairs made on the borrower's
tractor and permitted the creditor to retain possession of the
tractor. 197 In reviewing these cases, the Court specifically held
that the priority of liens stemming from federal lending programs
must be determined with reference to federal law. 98 However,
where federal law does not specify the appropriate rules for
decision and unless a uniform federal rule is required, nondiscriminatory state law is to be adopted as federal law.' 99
In reaching this conclusion, the Court dealt with two specific
questions: whether the application of federal law is required,
and what the content of federal law should be. With respect to
the first question, the Court noted that federal law has consistently been held to govern "questions involving the rights of the
United States arising under nationwide federal programs. ' ' 200 The
theory behind this position is that, "[s]ince the agencies derive
their authority to [act] from specific Acts of Congress passed in
the exercise of a 'constitutional function or power,' . . . their

rights, as well, should derive from a federal source."

"'

2°

Further,

See note 188 supra.

112See 440 U.S. at 718.
,91See id. at 719.
,9 See id.at 718.
191See note 188 supra.
116 See 440 U.S. at 723.

191See id.
I" See id. at 726.
199See id. at 740.
Id. at 726.
201Id. (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943))
(citing United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 209-210 (1970); United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1947); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co.,
317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942); Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343,
349-50 (1939)).
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where "Government activities 'aris[e] from and bea[r] heavily
upon a federal . .. program,' the Constitution and Acts of
Congress 'require otherwise than that state law govern of its
own force.' "202 Under this theory, state statutes or standards
may be used only "when Congress has not spoken 'in an area
comprising issues substantially related to an established program

of government operation'

"203

and where such standards are

4
required "to fill the interstices of the federal legislation.' '2
The Court was clearly more troubled by the content question.
It is clear from the Court's holding that Congress has the authority to fashion special rules to protect the federal interest
where it deems such rules are appropriate. 20 5 It is also clear that
where Congress has not acted, nondiscriminatory state law may
be applied as if it were the nationwide federal rule. 20 It is not
clear from the Court's decision, however, that state law must be
applied every time Congress is silent. 207 The Court specifically
identified three factors which must be considered in determining
whether state law may be applied or whether a special federal
rule must be judicially fashioned to protect the federal interest:
first, whether the federal programs are by their nature such that
a nationally uniform body of controlling federal rules is required; 20 8 second, whether the application of state law would
frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs; 2°9 and third,
whether the application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated upon state law. 210 Measuring the
Government's arguments against this criteria, the Court concluded that the state commercial code "furnishes convenient
solutions in no way inconsistent with adequate protection of the
federal interest. ' 21' Further the Court noted that incorporating
state law to determine the rights of the federal government

0 440 U.S. at 727.
20 Id. (quoting United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593
(1973)).
2'

Id. (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)).
See id. at 728.
See id.

See id. at 727-40.
See id. at 727.
See id.
210

See id. at 728-29.

211

Id. at 719 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. at 309).
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against private creditors would "in no way hinder administration

of the SBA and [FmHA] loan programs. "212
The Government argued unsuccessfully that the application
of state law would conflict with program objectives by making
it difficult to recover disbursed funds. 21 3 In response, the Court
concluded that
when the United States acts as a lender or a guarantor, it does
so voluntarily, with detailed knowledge of the borrower's financial status. The agencies evaluate the risks associated with
each loan, examine the interests of other creditors, choose the
security believed necessary to assure repayment, and set the
terms of every agreement. By carefully selecting loan recipients
and tailoring each transaction with state law in mind, the
agencies are fully capable of establishing terms that will secure
214
repayment.
The Government also argued that, in its posture as a social
welfare agency making loans to individuals who could not secure
credit from private lenders, it needs greater protection than that
afforded ordinary creditors. 2 5 The Court found this argument
unpersuasive as the agencies did not "indiscriminately distribute
public funds and hope that reimbursement will follow." 2 1 6 Both
agencies had extensive rules and instructions to insure that loan
recipients were financially reliable and to prevent improvident
loans .217
Price supports in the form of CCC loans arguably fall within
the rationale of Kimbell Foods. The Government takes a security
interest in the grain in exchange for the loan. In most cases the
grain will be encumbered with a prior lien which was created
before the crop was planted. The federal interest may easily be
perfected under state law without impairing the ability of the
agency to operate the program. Because the government lender
will generally have a lien of lower priority than the private
lender, it might stretch Kimbell Foods a little to argue that under
such circumstances the government lender does not need extra

22 See id. at 729.
213 Id. at 733.
214

Id. at 736 (citations omitted).

2I See id. at 737.
216
217

Id.
Id.
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protection. The CCC has instituted a practice of insisting on
subordination agreements or lien waivers as a prerequisite to
advancing money, effectively avoiding the difficult priority problem. One might wonder what the outcome would be if the private
lender refused to execute the waiver. In that case, the situation
could well be characterized as falling outside Kimbell Foods
because, in effect, the lender would be depriving the farmer of
an opportunity to participate in a price support program and
would thereby directly frustrate specific federal price support
policies. Under those circumstances, a court might well fashion
a special federal rule giving the government its needed protection
and removing the loans from Article Nine claims.
Most price support payments, however, do not raise the
priority issue addressed in Kimbell Foods. Support programs
involve a number of federal policies that have little, if anything,
to do with credit availability. 218 However, it is arguable that if
the application of state law, in a situation where a federal credit
interest is not involved, could be shown to jeopardize or frustrate
those other federal policies, the rule in Kimbell Foods would
require that a separate national rule be fashioned and that state
law not be applied.
It is significant that in Kimbell Foods, Congress had not
spoken with respect to the priority of the federal claims. At least
with respect to PIK, however, it may be argued that the implementing regulations do address the problem of liens under state
law. Federal regulations provide:
Except as provided in sub-paragraph (e) of this section, any
payment in kind or portion thereof which is due any person
shall be made without regard to questions of title under State
law, and without regard to any claim of lien against the
commodity, or proceeds thereof, which may be asserted by
219
any creditor.
Subparagraph (e) provides that
Assignments with respect to quantities of a commodity which
can be received by a producer as payment" in kind will be
recognized by the Department [of Agriculture] only if such

",SSee text accompanying
219

note 129 supra.

7 C.F.R. § 770.6(f) (1984).
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assignment is made on Form CCC-479, Assignment of Payment-In-Kind, executed by the assignor and assignee, and filed
with the county committee. 20°
Although this regulation represents a statement by the USDA,
and not by Congress, it is clear that a federal position has been
taken at least with respect to some liens under state law. This
arguably takes the matter outside of the Kimbell Foods rationale
and allows a court to refuse to apply state law to the issue. On
the other hand, the above provision could be construed as affecting only liens on the grain while in storage and not on the
grain after it is in the hands of the PIK participant. In that
case, the grain would pass free of any prior liens but might still
be subject to claims of the creditors of the PIK participant. This
seems a more reasonable construction. Nevertheless, if the impact of the provision is to cut off some liens (albeit those held
against the grain while it was in storage), it may serve as evidence
of a legislative intent to free the PIK grain from claims of
creditors generally. Before state law can be applied to any payment under a federal price support program it is necessary to
determine whether the purpose of the program could be effectively accomplished if the grain were not shielded entirely from
the claims of creditors both before and after the PIK transfer.
With price support programs, the government is attempting
to do much more than put money in the hands of farmers. It is
attempting to influence total farm production of the supported
commodity to benefit both farmers and consumers. 22' However,
because of the peculiarities of supply and demand in the farm
marketplace, reaching this goal has inevitably meant setting the
farm support price higher than the market price while not passing the cost on to the consumer.m Recently, the most effective
device has been the nonrecourse loan, where the government is
a "tentative purchaser" until the market acts and then becomes
the final owner of the grain if the market does not act favorably. 3 Market failures inevitably generate surplus stocks in the
hands of the government which are expensive to manage. The

-o 7 C.F.R. § 770.6(e) (1984).
See text accompanying notes 73-76, 102-106 supra.

2'

m
223

See text accompanying notes 115-17 supra.
See text accompanying notes 117-32 supra.
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only way to avoid these government surpluses is to sufficiently
curtail production so that market forces drive prices up, reducing
the possibility of a forfeiture to the government. The key to
successfully reducing already existing surplus stocks is to either
reduce production by insuring that enough farmers participate
to have the necessary impact on the market price or to dispose
of the surplus faster than it is acquired. For the last two years
the government has employed the PIK program primarily as a
device to dispose of the excessive government stocks and to drive
as a means to put
total production down, and only secondarily
224
income in the hands of the farmer.
In this context, even the CCC loans cannot be seen as just
another source of credit. In reality, credit availability is not a
major objective of the price support approach. 2 2 Therefore,
where farmers do not participate in price support programs
because of a fear that the benefits will immediately pass directly
through to their creditors, or where their security agreements
contemplate that only the crop itself would be the collateral, a
strong argument would be made that the state law dealing with
credit is discriminatory and has the effect of frustrating federal
policy goals. As noted below, however, the acceptance of such
an argument is unlikely.
The Kimbell Foods court indicated that one factor to be
considered in determining whether to fashion a federal rule is
the likely impact of such a rule on private credit. 226 It could be
argued that the price support programs neither encourage nor
promote the availability of private credit and that private lenders
should not be seen as the intended beneficiaries of these programs. The decision to participate in the price support programs
is a voluntary decision on the part of the farmer and the bank
should have no opportunity to compel or discourage participation as a prerequisite to the granting of private credit. Indeed,
if the farmer chooses not to participate, the bank is actually no
worse off. Fiscal responsibility suggests that the bank should not
determine the farmer's reliability as a borrower on the basis of
a government price support expectancy. It is arguable, therefore,

See PIK's Lasting Impact, PRORESSj E FARMER 6 (Sept. 1983); For the Future:
Less Government Farm Aid, PROGRESSrVE FAMER 19 (Sept. 1983).
2 See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra.
11 See 440 U.S. at 739-40.
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that farm credit sources would not be significantly affected if
the banks could not have access to the price support programs.
Indeed, the difficulty of securing adequate credit in rural areas
persists despite these payment programs, a situation which
prompted the creation of the Federal Farm Credit System and
the FmHA and SBA programs.2 27
Nearly all the cases that have addressed this issue appear to
assume without question state law applies and then proceed to
analyze the problem under Article Nine. 228 Kimbell Foods, on
the other hand, seems to suggest that the beginning point of
inquiry ought to be the impact of the state law on the federal
program objectives, 229 which is quite a different matter. In most
cases, courts appear content to apply state law on the theory
that it should be left to Congress to fashion a national rule, and
Congress, to date, has indicated no interest in creating such a
rule 0 In addition, there is a practical problem in raising the
federal price support issue since there is generally no federal
security interest or other similar governmental stake. Further,
the individual farmer undoubtedly lacks the data he needs to
support his contention that application of state law frustrates
federal policy. We, along with the courts, are therefore left with
state law, primarily Article Nine, analysis of the issue.
IV.

CREDITORS' CLAIMS AND PRIORITIES m PRICE SUPPORTS

Part IV of this Article deals with whether the farmer's secured creditors can reach and hang onto the money or other

21
See generally H. SPURLOCK & R. BIRD, ECoNoMICs, STATISTICS AND COOPERATIVES SERVICE, USDA, HOUSING CREDIT: A RuRAL-URAN CoMPARISoN, 11, RURAL
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH REP. No. 6 (1978).

2n For a discussion of the cases, see text beginning at note 326 infra. Most of them
ignore the Kimbell Foods problem. One exception is In re Kruse, 35 Bankr. 958 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1983), but even its treatment of the problem was summary. Without considering
the nature or extent of the federal policies involved, the court simply concluded:
The Court does not believe application of state law in any way hinders
the Government's attempt to stabilize the supply and demand problems
through PIK. Furthermore, the Uniform Commercial Code is adopted in
49 states, and is itself a type of non-federal, national policy. Accordingly,
under the rule of Kimbell Foods, state and not federal common law will
govern resolution of the issues at bar.

Id. at 963.
See 440 U.S. at 728.
m See text beginning with note 278 infra.
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entitlements generated by the farmer's participation in price
support programs. The legal analysis under Article Nine is different for each of the three types of programs and is affected
by the special crop rules and the history and policies discussed
in parts I and II of this Article.
A.

Post-productionLoans

In a postproduction loan, the federal government, usually
through the CCC, will loan money to the farmer and will take
a security interest in the farmer's stored grain. This procedure
puts the government in competition with the farmer's prior
general financier or crop lender for priority in the grain. An
interesting preliminary question, however, is whether the prior
lender can reach the loan proceeds.
Under section 9-306(1), a secured party is entitled to proceeds
of any original collateral which is disposed of or exchanged.
Therefore, the first question in the context of price support
programs is whether the crop has in fact been "disposed of"
and generated proceeds. Obviously, the farmer has not sold the
grain, and it is difficult, at first glance, to see how grain sitting
in a warehouse can be said to have been disposed of in any way.
Moreover, storage of the grain will not cut off the lender's
original security interest. 231 Since access to proceeds is based on
the concept of substitute collateral, until the original leaves the
farmer's control through exchange or other disposition, 23 2 there
would normally be little need to consider proceeds. This analysis,
however, does not answer the question. The Code makes quite
clear that disposition of the collateral does not always, or even
usually, cut off a security interest.23 Thus, absent a statutory
exception,2 4 the usual result of a disposition is that the lender
ends up doubling his security: he now may claim the proceeds
in addition to the original collateral. 2 5 There is no reason this
should not also be the case for farm lenders.

Cf. Oxford Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Dye, 368 So. 2d 241, 242 (Miss. 1979).
See U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 2.
2 See U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
211
-2

24

See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (for buyers in ordinary course of nonfarm collat-

eral).
.' Comment 3 to U.S.C. § 9-306 states in pertinent part: "The secured party may
claim both proceeds and collateral, but may of course have only one satisfaction."
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It has been recognized, in the farm context at least, that
section 9-306 should be read broadly to include "any type of
disposition, actual or constructive. ' 2 6 Many courts have taken
237
a less generous view and have refused to find a disposition
unless there was a "sale" within the meaning of Article Two,
including passage of title. 238 However, the expansive view seems
more appropriate especially in the farm context. Courts have
recognized that farm security agreements are drafted with one
eye on federal subsidy programs and have held that direct payments for such purposes as substandard or abandoned crops are
proceeds to a prior secured lender.23 9 At least one court has
stated that diminished crop yield amounted to a constructive
4
disposition sufficient to generate proceeds under section 9-306.2 0
Thus, it would seem that storage, especially if made for the
purpose of obtaining a CCC loan, is a disposition and the loan
proceeds should be covered under section 9-306.
Supporting authority can be found in nonfarm cases. In
National Acceptance Co. v. Virginia Capital Bank,24' the plaintiff lender had made advances under a general financing arrangement resembling an assignment of accounts receivable. The court
held that this financing arrangement was a "disposition" of the
collateral and that funds advanced pursuant to it were proceeds
both to the advancing creditor and to another secured creditor
who also had an interest in the accounts. 242 It does not seem too

In re Nivens, 22 Bankr. 287, 291 n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982). See also In re
Munger, 495 F.2d 511, 513 (9th Cir. 1974) (" 'proceeds' is to be given a flexible and
broad content").
237 See, e.g.,
Mechanics Nat'l Bank of Worcester v. Gaucher, 386 N.E.2d 1052,
1055 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
-8 U.C.C. §§ 2-106, 2-401. See also In re Cleary Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 9 Bankr.
40, 41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980) (money received from lease of goods was not proceeds
since there was no final or permanent disposition).
11 See, e.g., In re Munger, 495 F.2d at 512-13.
mOSee, e.g., In re Nivens, 22 Bankr. at 291, n.4.
498 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Va. 1980). See also United States v. Mitchell, 666 F.2d
1385, 1388 (lth Cir.) (storing soybeans for subsequent sale was disposition; advance
payment to farmer was proceeds), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982). But see J & J
Auto Sales, Inc., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 909, 912 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1971)
("proceeds" does not include contract rights based on separate agreement between debtor
and third party). In J & J Auto Sales, the dealer received a percentage of the wholesale
cost of each new car sold at retail. The court inexplicably held these funds were not
derived from the sale. See id.
See 498 F. Supp. at 1082.
2

24

14
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great a leap from this ruling to suggest that the granting of a
security interest is a sufficient disposition to generate proceeds.
The farmer's prior crop lender should then be entitled to reach
the proceeds of postharvest government loans under this theory
as well.
One must consider, however, whether the policies behind the
federal programs might somehow change the analysis. Presumably, most commodity loans are made for general purposes such
as operating expenses. In addition, one of the principal purposes
of these loans is to increase the farmer's income. 243 This is
accomplished by the nonrecourse nature of the loans and the
release mechanisms for repayment. 244 If the farmer's creditors
are entitled to snatch up the loan proceeds, the income purpose
of the program will be defeated. Further, while farm income is
normally the source from which farmers will repay their loans,
lenders have no security interest in this income simply because
the farmer owes them money. To allow them to claim postharvest loan proceeds might give them an unfair advantage and
therefore be detrimental to the farmer. If the government wanted
the funds to go to the farmer's creditors, it could always pay
them directly. This would also remove their conflicting, and
probably prior, security interests in the underlying grain.
But this argument has internal inconsistencies. As most farm
income comes from the sale of farm products, the proceeds of
these sales can always be reached by the farmer's secured lenders.
Since government loans are intended precisely to compensate for
poor sale returns, it makes little sense to treat those proceeds
differently.
As a practical matter, however, this may be a moot question.
In any case where creditors are disputing the rights to a farmer's
assets, the proceeds will likely have already been spent. The
contested issue in these cases is likely to be which creditor has
the best claim to the stored grain, and this priority struggle boils
down to one between two secured creditors. It would seem that
the ordinary first-to-file-or-perfect rule of Code section 9-312(5)

24 See text accompanying notes 75, 102 supra. It should be noted further that
another major purpose behind price supports is to reduce total national production and
stocks of surplus grain, regardless of whether an individual farmer's income position is
enhanced. See text accompanying notes 115-17 supra.
2- See descriptions of federal subsidy programs in Sections I and II supra.
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would control in this situation. A prior crop lender who properly
perfected should have priority over the government in the stored
grain. But this issue seems never to have arisen. Perhaps this is
because the CCC nearly always insists on getting subordination
agreements from the farmer's prior lenders. 245 Subordination
agreements are valid under section 9-316 and, if used, cause the
prior crop lender to lose its priority. If the lender does not agree
to subordination, the government may well decline to extend the
funds and the farmer may be driven into default or bankruptcy.
The crop lender's lot, alas, is not a happy one.
B.

Purchases

A commodity purchase by the CCC obviously involves a
disposition of collateral within the meaning of Code section 9306(1), and the farmer's crop lender, just as obviously, may
reach the sale proceeds .246 The more interesting question here is
whether the sale cuts off the prior lender's security interest in
,the crops themselves. On the surface, the answer seems easy.
Assuming the crops were farm products at the time of sale, the
special rule of section 9-307(1), applies, and the lender would
have priority. 247 However, there are at least two other possibilities which must be considered-first, whether the lender might
have authorized the sale in some way, and second, whether the
lender's interest might be cut off if the grain was warehoused
off the farm before the sale. The policies of price support
programs will also affect the analysis of these issues.
1. Authorized Sale
Under section 9-306(2), a security interest is cut off if "the
disposition was authorized by the secured party." Most of the
cases dealing with the issue of implied authorization have involved livestock, and the courts most often have sided with the
lender. 248 There is not much to be gained by debating the point

245See text accompanying notes 217-27 supra.

See U.C.C. § 9-306(l), (3).
-" For a discussion of this rule see text accompanying notes 40-51 supra.
24 The leading case is Garden City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 N.W.2d 99
(Neb. 1971). See generally B. CLARK, supra note 39, at 8.413][c].
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in the crop context. 249 Besides, it is always possible, on the facts
20
of a given case, that an express waiver can be found.
A more interesting problem is whether the general circumstances of crop lending might inherently authorize the farmer to
deal with the CCC and whether, therefore, a sale to the CCC
under a commodity purchase program might be considered "authorized by the secured party" within the meaning of Code
section 9-306(2). In In re Sunberg,25' the court ruled that a
farmer's secured creditor could reach PIK entitlements as afteracquired general intangibles. 212 The court noted that government
subsidy programs dominate modern farming and that the parties
253
must have dealt with each other with these programs in mind.
In Sunberg, this overall context worked to the lender's advantage
since the court felt it was the parties' unexpressed intention that
rights under the PIK program be reached by a general security
agreement covering all the debtor's farm property interests.254
Presumably the parties deal with each other within the context of all farm subsidies, including commodity purchases. If
the lender and the farmer both know that the farmer might sign
up for a commodity purchase program, it is logical to argue
that the lender has given advance consent for this participation.
The lender's security interest would subsequently be lost under
section 9-306(2) when the sale to the CCC occurred. 25 This result
would place farm commodity purchases more in line with the
general law regarding inventory purchases, where expectations
are similar. It may also further the purposes of the government's
purchase program. The lender is not hurt since it can get the
proceeds, and the grain, now in the hands of the government,

2, For a case involving crops, see Vermilion County Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Izzard,
249 N.E.2d 352 (Il1. App. 1969). See also In re Thomas, 38 Bankr. 50 (Bankr. N.D.
1983); Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Oldham, 569 S.W.2d 833 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1977).
I 0 See, e.g., North Cent. Kansas Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co., 577
P.2d 35 (Kan. 1978).
2, 729 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1984).
" See id. at 562.
25 See id.

2-"
See id. at 562-63.
2 Under U.C.C. § 9-306(2), if the disposition was authorized by the secured party
in the security agreement or otherwise, a sale, exchange or other disposition of the
collateral cuts off the security interest.
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will very likely be held for distribution under PIK or some other
program.
2.

Off-farm Storage

Farmers often store harvested crops in commercial warehouses. The warehouses for the farmers' accounts, then, often
sell these crops to ordinary course buyers. The Code provides
two possible arguments under which the farmer's secured lender
might be cut off by these sales.
The first possibility is that the crops have ceased to be farm
products, and as a result, the special exception for ordinary
course buyers of farm products in section 9-307(1) would not
apply. Under section 9-109(3), to be farm products the crops
must be "in the possession of a debtor engaged in ... farming
operations." The statutory question is whether off-farm storage
puts the crops out of the farmer's possession and thereby transforms them into inventory.
The term "possession" is used nearly four dozen times and
appears in every article of the UCC,26 but it is defined nowhere.
The drafters clearly meant to leave the definition to case-by-case
development according to context. Off-farm storage involves a
temporary shift in location of the collateral pending sale, and it
removes the crop from the farmer's physical custody. But physical custody may not be the only, or even the determining, test.
The farmer will probably get a warehouse receipt representing
the stored crop, and, if so, he will continue to have control over
the crop. Since control is one of the key attributes of possession,
holding a warehouse receipt might be read as the equivalent of
possession for purposes of secton 9-109(3).
This approach would be consistent with the Code's treatment
of perfection of security interests in warehoused goods2 7 Under
section 9-304(3), when a nonnegotiable warehouse receipt is issued, a secured party may perfect by notifying the warehouseman. This is deemed, under section 9-305, to constitute possession
of the goods by the secured party. The secured party, in turn,
must acquire possession of the receipt from the debtor, the
256 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201(14) ("[d]elivery ...
means voluntary transfer of
possession"), 2-103(1)(c) (" '[r]eceipt' of goods means taking physical possession").
- See U.C.C. § 9-304(3).
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person who granted the security interest. Therefore, it would be
inconsistent to hold that the debtor did not have possession of
the warehoused crop in the first place. Moreover, if this argument holds for situations involving nonnegotiable receipts, it
must also hold when there is a negotiable receipt. Here, the only
way to deal with the goods is through the receipt. 25 8 It would
seem that the person who has possession of the receipt should
be deemed to have possession of the goods. This is especially
true when the purpose of determining possession is not to allocate risk of loss or destruction, but is merely to assign the goods
to categories that are inevitably artificial.
A conclusion that off-farm storage does not transform the
crops into inventory would also be consistent with the result in
cases involving on-farm storageY 9 Surely a farmer who stores
grain in his own silo or warehouse is in possession of the grain,
and its character as farm products is not open to serious question. 26° The result should not be different when a farmer stores
his grain in someone else's storage facilities.
Even if we assume the crops become inventory when they
are stored off the farm, the consequence to the buyer-lender is
not crystal clear. At first glance it would seem that the general
rule of section 9-307(1) applies, and that the buyer would cut
off the farmer's prior secured creditor.2 6 Most farmers would
easily qualify as being "in the business of selling goods of that
kind" so that the buyer would qualify as one "in ordinary course
of business.' ' 262 Also, assuming that the farmer did not sell the

2" See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 7-502, 9-304(4).
.9 See Oxford Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Dye, 368 So. 2d 241 (Miss. 1979). The court
in Dye did not state whether storage was on or off the farm, but the context seems to
indicate on-farm storage. The court held the goods were farm products. Id. at 242.

- See U.C.C. § 9-109(3).
Under the general rule of U.C.C. § 9-307(1), "[a] buyer in ordinary course of
business ... takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security
interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence.
2
A "buyer in ordinary course of business" must buy "from a person in the
business of selling goods of that kind." U.C.C. § 1-201(9). Under Article 2, a "merchant" is "a person who deals in goods of the kind." U.C.C. § 2-104(1). There is
endless confusion in the courts over whether a farmer should be treated as a "merchant."
In Kansas, an important farming state, the courts have answered both ways, depending
on the context. Compare Decatur Coop Ass'n v. Urban, 547 P.2d 323, 329 (Kan. 1976)
(farmer not a merchant for purposes of statute of frauds) with Musil v. Hendrich, 627
P.2d 367, 373 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (farmer is a merchant for purposes of the implied
warranty of merchantability). While a buyer in ordinary course will nearly always buy
261
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grain to the warehouse, the security interest at stake was "created by [the] seller" and would be cut off under section 9307(1).263

The analysis may not be this simple, however. Professor
Gilmore has suggested that merely changing the character of the
264
collateral may not defeat a claim by a prior secured creditor.
He posits the following case:
[A] debtor acquires goods, let us assume, as equipment for use
in his business or as consumer goods for his own use. Thereafter and without the knowledge of the secured party the
debtor, who happens to be a dealer, puts the goods in his
inventory and sells them to a good faith buyer without notice
in a transaction which is, 265from the buyer's point of view,
entirely in ordinary course.
Gilmore first correctly noted that the changed use does not, of
itself, affect the secured party's perfection, even though the new
character of the collateral would have required an original filing
in a different place. 266 From this he concludes that the debtor's
wrongful act of putting equipment or consumer goods into inventory should not vary priorities and the rule of section 9267
307(1) should not apply.
Even if Gilmore is correct, the farm situation may nevertheless call for a different result. Gilmore suggests that section 9307(1) should cut off only a secured party which knows when it
enters the transacton that it "is financing goods of a type which
the [debtor] can sell to a 'buyer in ordinary course of business.' ",268 The crop lender not only knows of this possibility, it

from a merchant, this need not be the determinative factor. In deciding whether a farmer
is to be held to higher merchant standards under Article 2, the courts are worried about
different policy considerations than those raised by Article 9 questions. In a dispute
under § 9-307(1), it is no burden on the farmer to decide that he is in the business of
selling grain so that his buyer qualifies as a buyer in ordinary course. It should make
no difference whether he is also a "merchant" under Article 2.
See note 261 supra.
26

1" See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 6, at § 26.8.
265 Id.
at 699.

See U.C.C. § 9-401(3). Gilmore's treatise cites § 9-401(2); presumably this is a
misprint. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 6, at 700. The context, the language, and the
cross-reference to § 18.22 of the treatise all indicate that he meant to cite § 9-401(3).
This subsection was not renumbered in the 1972 UCC revisions.
167
See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 6, at 700.
26 Id.
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hopes the farmer will sell in the ordinary course. It also knows,
or should know, that harvested grain very often ends up in a
commercial warehouse. Even if this process causes the grain to
shift from one arbitrary statutory classification to another,
everyone knows the shift is likely to occur.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the transaction should
not be considered from the buyer's viewpoint. 269 In United States
v. Hext,270 the court stressed the buyer's viewpoint in a farm
storage situation. The debtor in Hext was a cotton farmer who
owned his own'separately incorporated ginning operation. The
cotton was harvested by the farmer, ginned by the farmer's
company, and then stored in a commercial warehouse. Negotiable warehouse receipts were issued in the name of the ginning
company. The cotton was later sold through a brokerage firm
by sight drafts against the warehouse receipts.27 ' The court pointed
out that the prior secured creditor-in this case the United
States-was aware all along that the cotton would be ginned and
marketed by the farmer/debtor through his own ginning company. 272 The court also noted that neither the warehouse nor the
broker had actual knowledge of the prior security interest. 273
Regarding the rights of the prior secured party as against
the ultimate buyer, the court made several observations. In the
average case (although not in Hext) the farmer would sell his
cotton to an independent gin. This sale would be covered by the
farm products exception to section 9-307(1), and the secured
party's rights would not be affected. When the gin later sold the
cotton, the secured party would continue to be protected, since,
under section 9-307(1), a buyer cuts off only prior security
interests "created by his seller. ' 274 In Hext itself, the prior
creditor lost to the buyer. The court recognized that ginned
cotton is still farm products, 275 so the exception would seem to
apply and protect the secured party. However, the court noted
that from the buyer's point of view the sale was made by the

id.
270
444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971).
See id.at 805-06.
272See id.at 812.

269 See

27I

See id.at 816.

274Id. at
21

814 (quoting U.C.C. § 9-307(2)).

See id.at 813.
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ginning company. 76 Because the gin, unlike the farmer, was not
"a person engaged in farming operations," the farm products
exception did not apply. 277 In addition, after treating the farmer
and the gin as separate persons to solve the "farming operations" problem, the court then treated them as the same person
to iron out the "created by his seller" wrinkle. 278 The court
justified this result through the secured party's prior knowledge
that the farmer ginned his own cotton. z79
Where all of this leads in the context of commodity purchase
programs is unclear. If, as seems likely, storage does not cause
farm products to lose their character, then the farm products
exception would seem to apply and protect the prior farm lender
at the expense of the government as buyer. This result is particularly intriguing in light of the drafters' fear that abolishing the
farm products exception in section 9-307(1) would cause the
government to reenact it as federal law.280 That fear considered
only the government's role as lender; here, the government is
buyer. Presumably, even the federal government should not have
it both ways.
But even if storage does not create inventory out of farm
products, the crop lender's troubles are not over. When the
farmer stores the grain, the warehouseman will probably issue a
warehouse receipt to the farmer. 281 If everyone is playing aboveboard, the receipt may even be issued jointly to the farmer and
his lender; in either case, the lender will have rights in the receipt.
Ideally, when the warehouse sells the grain for the farmer's
account, the receipt will be duly negotiated (or transferred if it
is nonnegotiable) 2 2 to the buyer. This gives the buyer all rights
in the grain 283 and cuts off by consent the secured lender's rights.

276

17

Id.
Id. at 813-14.

271See id. at 814.

279See id.
2 See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
21'The warehouseman may issue something less formal, such as a scale or weight
ticket. Those tickets are used for the same basic purposes and would seem to qualify as
warehouse receipts under U.C.C. § 1-201(45). Cf. U.C.C. § 1-201(15) (warehouse receipt
is a document of title if "issued by or addressed to a bailee"). Cf. also Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Kansas, 247 F.2d 315, 320 (10th Cir. 1957); State ex rel.
Crawford v. Centerville Grain Co., 618 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980). Both
Hartford and Crawford treat scale tickets as warehouse receipts.
282 Only a negotiable receipt can be negotiated. U.C.C. § 7-501.

-3 See U.C.C. § 7-502.
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Commercial practice, however, may not always be so tidy.
The warehouse may sell the grain in the ordinary course to grain
merchants and the like without bothering to transfer the warehouse receipts. Even this practice may produce no dire consequences as long as the proceeds are paid over to the farmer and,
especially, to his financer (and as long as the receipts are cancelled). But warehousemen have been known to abscond with
the proceeds, and the practice of selling without accounting for
the receipts may produce a shortage. Here, the farmer and his
bank, and other farmers and their banks, have obvious claims
against the warehouse as issuer of the documents. 28 However,
since there is not likely to be enough grain to go around, it is
important to know whether the bank can recover from the buyer.
Under section 7-205 the answer is no. This section applies to
fungible goods sold and delivered by a warehouseman. An ordinary course buyer who is in the business of dealing in the
particular goods cuts off the right of anyone who claims through
the warehouse receipts.285 This section is thus an exception to
course of
Code section 9-307(1) and permits a buyer in ordinary 286
farm products to take free of a prior security interest.
Section 7-205 has been applied against the government as
crop lender. 287 Whether the government as buyer under the commodity purchase program would be protected by this same section is not clear, however. Presumably the CCC qualifies as a
buyer who deals with the particular goods. But it has been held
that this section requires an actual sale and physical delivery of
the goods; a sale by mere transfer of the warehouse receipts is
not enough. n8 If this is the rule, the CCC would often not
qualify. The CCC regularly takes delivery of certain processed
dairy products, but most other commodities are left in storage
- See U.C.C. § 7-403. See also Preston v. United States, 696 F.2d 528, 536 (7th
Cir. 1982).
-5 See U.C.C. § 7-205.
It is possible to read U.C.C. § 7-205 as cutting off only those rights claimed by
the creditor through the receipt. This leaves it open to the creditor to argue that its
rights under Article 9 exist independently of the receipt and are not disturbed. This
argument seems strained; § 7-205 should be read as an exception to § 9-307(1) (more
precisely, to the § 9-307(1) exception).
7 See, e.g., In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 96,
100-102 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1973).
I See Midland Bean Co. v. Farmers State Bank, 552 P.2d 317, 323 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1976).
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facilities - which have been contracted for under the purchase
program - until they are resold for export or donated for use
in various domestic and foreign assistance programs. 289 To take
advantage of the cut-off rights under section 7-205, the CCC
would have to take delivery and then, presumably, restore the
commodities in another contracted warehouse. 290 This procedure
would be cumbersome and wasteful and there seems no reason
the CCC should not be protected here as it would be in the
dairy cases. Looking to avoid the effects of the delivery requirement, a court might find this just the place to apply a special
federal priority rule. 29' But Code drafters feared this approach
all along. 292 Perhaps the desired result could be reached under
section 7-205 by considering that, by virtue of the warehouseman's agreement to act for the CCC under the program, the
CCC has taken either constructive delivery or delivery through
an agent.
Of course this problem does not arise if the CCC, as buyer,
is careful to take warehouse receipts. In fact, it sometimes happens that the farmer fails to turn the receipts over to its crop
lender and instead delivers them directly to the buyer, thus
allowing the buyer to acquire rights superior to those of the
lender. 293 If the receipt were negotiable, the buyer is very likely
to become a holder by "due negotiation. ' 294 This status gives
the buyer rights superior to those of even prior perfected secured
creditors. 295 Code section 7-503 protects some prior secured parties who had their rights perfected before the receipt was issued.
However, the secured party loses its protection under this provision if it entrusts the goods to the debtor with authority, actual
or apparent, either to store them or to dispose of them in any

See 1 J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 3, at 261.
See, e.g., 552 P.2d at 323 (The word "delivered" under U.C.C. § 7-205 "means
delivered in fact, not symbolic delivery by means of a transfer of documents." (emphasis
in original)).
29' For a discussion of this issue, see notes 219-28 supra and accompanying text.
292 See note 50 supra and accompanying text. On the other hand, since most price
support payments do not involve the federal government as lender, the credit issues are
not the same in price support situations as in the Kimbell Foods loans, and hence, a
separate federal rule may be entirely justified. See text accompanying notes 217-28 supra.
'

2

See U.C.C.

§§ 7-504,

- See U.C.C. § 3-202.
-'

See U.C.C. § 9-309.

9-301(l)(c).
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The secured party also loses if it acquiesces in the farmer's procurement of the receipt. 297 In the context of farming
authority to store harvested crops would seem to be implied in
nearly all situations. 298 Thus, the buyer who takes a negotiable
warehouse receipt will have priority over the prior creditor. 299
The CCC normally takes negotiable warehouse receipts and would
therefore be protected by these rules.
A buyer under nonnegotiable receipts, however, has fewer
rights. 3 0 Under section 7-504(1), a transferee of a nonnegotiable
warehouse receipt or other document of title acquires the rights
the transferor "had or had actual authority to convey." Assuming the lender gave no authorization, these rights are subject to
the lender's prior security interest. As noted above, the bank
will very likely have entrusted or acquiesced under section 7503.301 But it has been held that section 7-503 applies only to
negotiable documents because that section deals with rights acquired by due negotiation. 30 2 Thus, when nonnegotiable documents are involved, it takes actual authority to cut off the prior
secured party.
Under section 7-504(2), the transferee who takes nonnegotiable receipts can enlarge its rights by giving notice to the warehouseman. Notice cuts off the rights of "those creditors of the
transferor who could treat the sale as void under section 2402.' '303 But this reference includes only those creditors who
might have rights under the law of fraudulent conveyances or
ostensible ownership; secured creditors of the seller are unaffected. 30 4 Also, when goods are subject to a nonnegotiable document, the goods are still dealt with as goods. Unlike the situation
way.

2 96

- See U.C.C. § 7-503(l)(a).
- See U.C.C. § 7-503(l)(b).
19'See text accompanying notes 268-69 supra.

- See U.C.C. § 7-503(l)(a).
See U.C.C. § 7-504.
''

See text accompanying notes 296-97 supra.
See Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Esslair Endsley Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep.

Serv. (Callaghan) 176, 190 (W.D. Mich. 1971). See also Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v.
Irving R. Boody Co., I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 560, 565-66 (1963)(Funk, Arb.).
-' U.C.C. § 7-504(2)(a) (1972).
3 Under U.C.C. § 2-402(2) a creditor of the seller may treat the sale as void "if
as against him a retention of possession by the seller is fraudulent under any rule of
law of the state where the goods are situated." For an example of such a law, see KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 33-103 (1981).
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involving negotiable receipts, the document is not a complete
substitute for the goods. Thus, with a nonnegotiable receipt, the
security interest would still be in the goods, the goods would
probably still be farm products, and the farm products exception
of section 9-307(1) would still apply to protect the prior secured
creditor.
Again, we have a different result created by the special farm
products rule. The fact that the result is different for a nonnegotiable document than for a negotiable document is not the
30 5
problem; takers of negotiable paper often have greater rights.
But here, the distinction is created not by the character of the
paper, but by the character of the underlying goods. For all but
farm products, a buyer in ordinary course, even through a
nonnegotiable document, cuts off the prior security interest under section 9-307(1). A buyer of farm products through a negotiable document accomplishes the same thing under section 9309. The result should not be different for the buyer who happens to deal in farm products through nonnegotiable paper.
To sum up, the result of the priority struggle between a crop
lender and the CCC as crop buyer is not at all clear under
Article Nine. The lack of clarity is caused by the special exception to Code section 9-307(1) for ordinary course buyers of farm
products. Absent this exception, which we have already suggested cannot be justified, 301 the lender would always lose its
claim to the crops and would have to be content with the
proceeds. Even under present law this result can be reached in
all cases by holding that sale to the CCC is impliedly contemplated by all parties from the beginning and was therefore "authorized" within the meaning of section 9-306(2).3 Apart from
this, the prior crop lender will be cut off only if the crop is
stored off the farm and either this storage is deemed (an unlikely
result) to transform the crops from farm products into inventory0 8
or if a negotiable warehouse receipt is issued and used to sell
39
the crop to the CCC. 0

"I Compare U.C.C. § 7-502 with U.C.C. § 7-504.
See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
- See text accompanying note 255 supra.
See text accompanying notes 261-63 supra.
See text accompanying notes 281-83 supra.
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This inconsistency and confusion should be eliminated, by
amendment to the U.C.C. if necessary. Priority disputes should
not be resolved on the basis of particular practices (for example,
on- or off-farm storage and use of negotiable or nonnegotiable
receipts) which may vary from farm to farm or region to region.
These disputes should, instead, be analyzed with a view to the
underlying policies and equities involved.
C. Direct Payments
In direct payment programs, the government gives the farmer
money or some other form of payment to make up for some
deficiency in the crop produced or to persuade the farmer not
to produce at all. 310 Since the government acquires neither ownership nor a security interest in the underlying crop, it presumably will have no stake in the outcome of any priority dispute.
However, priority disputes are likely to arise among the farmer's
other creditors - including, inevitably, the trustee in bankruptcy. The legal problem in each case is to identify the nature
of each creditor's interest and then to apply the usual priority
rules. 3a1 In direct payment programs this is not as easy as it
sounds.
The first question is whether the prior secured creditor can
reach the proceeds bf these direct payments at all. This, in turn,
depends somewhat on the nature of the specific programs whether providing payments in cash or payments in kind.
1.
a.

The Nature of the Creditor's Claim

Cash Programs

It seems settled that the crop lender can reach payments
under cash programs as proceeds. In In re Munger 12 the security
agreement covered "all crops" and the proceeds. The farmer
received two types of federal cash payments. The first was based
on the sugar content of harvested sugar beets; the second was

3M0
For a discussion of direct payment programs see text accompanying notes 139-

52 supra.
31 See U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-312.
31 495 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1974).
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based on acreage abandoned because of crop disease. 3 In both
instances, the court had little trouble concluding that the creditor
could reach these payments as proceeds of the crop under Code
section 9-306. The court noted that these payments were "an
integral part of the sugar beet farming business," and that "the
security agreements were drafted with an awareness of the importance of ... federal subsidy payments to the realities of
financing a farming operation based on sugar beets. 31 4 From
this, the court concluded that the parties intended that the se31 5
curity agreement reach disaster payments.
The court also noted that, since the amount of some of the
payments was partially determined by marketing factors, these
16 Of
payments were closely connected with sale of the crop.
course, in a true sale, any payment received would be proceeds.
Drawing an analogy to the sale concept, the court concluded
that these payments would be "proceeds under even the most
grudging interpretation of the security agreement. ' 3 1 7 Presumably, they would be "proceeds" under even "the most grudging
interpretation" of section 9-306 as well.
The court in In re Nivens31 8 agreed. In Nivens the government
made deficiency and disaster payments to compensate for low
yield. The payments were made after the crop was sold, and the
319
court held that the crop lender could reach them as proceeds.
Although the Nivens court failed to discuss the possibility, because these payments are a form of insurance, they could also
have been reached as proceeds. As the court pointed out in
320
Munger, these payments are similar to insurance payments.
Indeed, some federal disaster payments of this type are labeled
"insurance. ' 32 1 In the 1972 Official Text, Code section 9-306(1)
expressly declares that casualty insurance payments are pro-

3,3See
314Id.

id. at 513.

315See id.
316See

id.

Id.
3,1 22 Bankr. 287 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
319Id. at 289-94.
317

311See

495 F.2d at 513.
For a discussion of crop insurance programs see I J.
WADLEY, supra note 3, at ch. 15.
32

JUERGENSMEYER AND J.
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ceeds. 322 Certainly, at least in states which have enacted the 1972
text, this should be conclusive, and federal disaster payments of
this type should be considered proceeds. The majority of the
323
1962 Code states also take this view.
Since the farmer's prior crop lender can reach federal cash
subsidy payments as proceeds, it should have no trouble establishing its priority as against other claimants. Under section 9306(3)(b), the original perfection extends to cash proceeds, and
under section 9-312(6) this perfection is good against competing
secured parties. If the payments are received after the farmer
3 24
has filed bankruptcy, section 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
should protect the creditor against the trustee; however, payments received during the ninety day prebankruptcy period might
be challenged as preferences. 325 Since this issue is worthy of
separate discussion, we deal with it separately below.
b.

Payment In Kind (PIK)Programs

Under PIK programs, the farmer receives grain as a substitute for a crop he either agrees to turn under or never plants in
the first place.3 26 The crop lender's intended collateral has thus
ceased to exist or has never come into existence. Under what
legal theory can the lender reach the PIK entitlements?
If the crop was once growing and was turned under as part
of the farmer's agreement with the government, it is possible to
conclude that the entitlements are proceeds under section 9-

In "Insurance payable by reason of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds,
except to the extent that it is payable to a person other than a party to the security
agreement." U.C.C. § 9-306(1).
I See, e.g., In re Sexton, 16 Bankr. 240, 245 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); Ettinger
v. Central Penn Nat'l Bank, 2 Bankr. 385, 892 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
634 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1980).
'
11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982) provides:
[I]f the debtor and a secured party enter into a security agreement before
the commencement of the case ... [which] extends to property of the

debtor acquired before the commencement of the case and to proceeds ...
of such property, then such security interest extends to such proceeds ...
acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to the extent
provided by such security agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy
law....
M See, e.g., In re Nivens, 22 Bankr. at 292-94.
12 See, e.g., In re Kruse, 35 Bankr. 958, 961 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
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306.327 The notion of "disposition" is probably broad enough
to include plowing under, or other destruction, of existing collateral. While destruction of collateral is not normally encouraged, here it is a required part of a specific government program.
As a result, the crop lender should be allowed to reach the
entitlements as substitute collateral or as proceeds. In In re
Kruse328 the farmer signed up for the PIK program and agreed
to turn under some growing crops and to refrain from planting
others.329 With respect to the growing crop, the court correctly
held the PIK entitlements were proceeds and let the lender claim
them as against the trustee. Since the case involved payments
due after bankruptcy had been filed,330 the court based its ruling
on Bankruptcy Code section 552(b).
In cases where the farmer signs up for PIK before the crops
are planted, the analysis is more complicated. If the farm lender
relies exclusively on crops as security, one might well ask whether
it has any security at all. As discussed in part I of this Article,
after-acquired property clauses are no longer limited, and a
lender may take future crops as collateral. 331 Such a clause does
not apply if the future collateral never appears; therefore, how
332
can there be proceeds of collateral which does not exist?
Several courts have faced this question in PIK cases; 333 all
but one ruled in favor of the creditor. The courts' theories,
however, differ. In In re Sunberg334 the farmer withheld corn
acreage from production. The creditor, a production credit association (PCA), held a broad security interest in all of the
debtor's present and after-acquired farm-related property, including crops and general intangibles. 335 In bankruptcy, the trustee
challenged the PCA's claim to the PIK entitlements. The court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling that the entitlements were
3M ,,'Proceeds' includes whatever is received upon the sale... or other disposition

of collateral." U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (emphasis added).
35 Bankr. 958.
'
See id. at 966.
33 See id.
33, See notes 8-17 supra and accompanying text.
13
"To this Court's knowledge, no court has ever held that the rights under PIK,

or any other entitlement program, stemming from an agreement not to grow crops, are
proceeds of anything." 35 Bankr. at 966.
'

See, e.g., In re Sunberg, 729 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1984).

334 Id.

" See id. at 561-62.
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general intangibles and that the PCA could reach them under
the broad clause in the security agreement. 3a 6 Any actual distributions of grain under these entitlements, even after bankruptcy,
would be proceeds protected by Bankruptcy Code section
3 37
552(b).
An alternative route to the PIK entitlements was taken in In
re Preisser.3 18 The government itself was the prior lender, but
instead of a security interest in crops or other personal property,
it held a real estate mortgage. The mortgage by its terms covered
"rents, issues and profits," 3 3 9 and the court held this clause was
sufficient to reach PIK entitlements. 314 This analysis is less than
wholly satisfactory. As noted earlier, crops are universally treated
as personal property, not real property.34' To get a security
interest in crops, the lender must comply with Article Nine; real
estate or mortgage law does not apply. 3 42 Thus, if Preissermeans
that the lender can reach crops (or their substitute, e.g., PIK)
via a real estate mortgage, the decision is wrong.
On the other hand, it has long been recognized that, at some
point in the mortgage transaction, the mortgagee is entitled to
"rents, issues and profits" from the mortgaged land, including
crops.3 43 In so-called lien states, such as Colorado, 3" that right
does not generally accrue until after foreclosure. 345 Thus, it
would seem that the government's rights in Preisser would depend on whether foreclosure proceedings had been completed.
The opinion gives us no clue. Since the debtor was in bankruptcy, we may presume default had occurred, but it is doubtful
that foreclosure had been completed since the filing of bankruptcy would have stayed any foreclosure proceedings. 346 The
court ignored all of this and said simply that PIK benefits "must

See id. at 562-63.
See id. at 562.

33 Bankr. 65 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
Id. at 66.
I3'
1'4

3,2

See id. at 66-67.
See notes 4-5 supra and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Newcomb, 682 F.2d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 1982).

R. BROWN, supra note 5 at § 17.3.
See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 38-39-105 (1982).
1'
See R. BROWN, supra note 5 at § 17.3. See also G.
Wmri.N, supra note 55 at § 4.26.
''

OSBORNE,

G. NELSON & D.

-" See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982). See also In re Jenkins, 19 Bankr. 105, 109-10
(D. Colo. 1982).
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be construed to be rents or profits of the land. ' 347 The court
based this conclusion on the fact that "any grain which the
debtor had grown on this land would have been considered rents
or profits of the land. ' 348 As one court noted, Preisser "is
' 349
factually deficient, [and] of minimal precedential value.
In a pair of Ohio cases, the courts faced the more difficult
question of whether the creditor can reach PIK entitlements
where the security agreement mentioned only "crops" and the
crops never came into existence. The creditor was allowed to
claim the PIK entitlements in both cases. In the first, In re
Lee, 350 the court said the issue was "[w]hether the PIK benefits
fall within the category of growing crops and their proceeds.' ' a 1
The court first recognized that "PIK benefits are a substitute
for the corn crop [the] debtors normally . . . planted. ' 352 The
court then simply held that since "any corn or proceeds of corn
. . would have been covered by the security interest . . ., its
substitute-the benefits under the PIK program-should be
'353
treated the same.
In the second Ohio case, In re Cupp,3 54 the court came to
the same conclusion. As in Lee, the security agreement covered
crops and proceeds, but said nothing about general intangibles.
The debtor signed up for the PIK program before planting and
then assigned his benefits to a partnership consisting of the
debtor, his wife and his mother. The creditor sought to enjoin
the assignment and establish its priority. 355 It could have priority
only if its security agreement reached the PIK entitlements.
The court, in a well-reasoned opinion, ruled in favor of the
creditor and gave two rationales for so doing. First, after discussing the policies of the federal programs and the broad reading given to the concept of "proceeds" in Munger and Nivens,
the court ruled that the PIK benefits were "proceeds" under the
*

33 Bankr. at 67.
Id.
39 In re Kruse, 35 Bankr. at 965.
14

349

31035 Bankr. 663 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983).

"I Id. at 666.
Id.
353 Id.
34 38 Bankr. 953 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
352

31 See id. at 953-54.
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security agreement.3 56 This was so even though the crops were
not planted and no original collateral could be identified.
Since the term 'proceeds' is intended to apply to that which is
produced from a creditor's collateral which, in the absence of
the PIK program, would have been grown, it must also apply
to that which is produced as though it had been grown. Therefore, it would follow that PIK proceeds are proceeds of the
crops within the meaning of the security agreement.
It should also be noted that if this Court were to hold that
PIK proceeds are not 'proceeds' an artificial distinction would
be created between proceeds from the sale of crops actually
grown and the proceeds received as though they had been grown.
It would also create an unconscionable means by which a farmer
could defeat a creditor's security. If PIK payments were not proceeds, a farmer could abandon all farming activities in favor of
program participation, thereby allowing him to dissipate the proceeds of the programs without any regard for their [sic] creditor's
interests. Such a result cannot be permitted.357
Second, the court said it could reach the same result simply
by reading the obvious intent of the parties into the security
agreement.35 8 The court agreed with Munger that the parties
entered the security agreement with both eyes open and with an
awareness of the federal price support programs. "The comprehensive language of the agreement must be read in the context
of that awareness. ' 35 9 Moreover,
[i]n view of the all-inclusive character of the agreement, it
must be concluded that the contract expresses the intent that
the Plaintiff was to acquire a security interest in whatever
recompense the Debtor-In-Possession received as a farmer,
regardless of whether it was for having raised crops or for
participating in a government subsidy program. Accordingly,
PIK proceeds would be included within the Plaintiff's security
interest. 360

1-6See id. at 955.
" Id. at 955-56.
See id.
"'
360

Id.
Id.

at 956.
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This seems to be the correct way to interpret a farm security
agreement.
In another case, In re Kruse,361 the court denied the creditor's
claim to PIK benefits based on crops never planted. 362 This
decision may be explained primarily as turning on the particular
bankruptcy setting involved. But the court went further and
expressed doubt that the creditor could have won anyway. 63 The
farmer had entered the PIK program, with the court's permission, after bankruptcy was filed. This brings into play Bankruptcy Code section 552 which cuts off the secured creditor's
claim to postbankruptcy property under an after-acquired property clause, but which allows the creditor to reach postbankruptcy proceeds of prebankruptcy collateral. 364 The security
agreement covered only crops, not "general intangibles," and
there were no prebankruptcy crops subject to this claim. In this
case, there were no prebankruptcy general intangibles either, but
the court said that even the security agreement's mentioning
them would not have helped. 365 The court did agree with the
ruling in Sunberg that PIK entitlements were general intangi366
bles.
The court went on, however, to say that the PIK entitlements
could not be claimed as proceeds, at least in cases where the
crop had not been planted. The court treated the concept of
"proceeds" as presuming the existence of some original collateral which is sold or otherwise disposed of. Finding no original
367
collateral, the court held that the creditor had no claim.
Under the Kruse approach, there are apparently only two
paths to PIK entitlements: either the security agreement must
expressly cover general intangibles, or the crop must first be
planted and then plowed under. 36 We believe this approach is
too limited and that the Ohio court in Cupp 69 offered a better
analysis. The effect of Kruse is to make the crop lender's rights

35 Bankr. 958.
m See id. at 966.
363 See id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a)-(b) (1982).
-'

See 35 Bankr. at 966.
-17

16

See id.
See id. See also note 332 supra.
See 35 Bankr. at 966.

69 38

Bankr. 953.
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turn on the extent to which the crop had been planted when the
farmer signed up for the program. But planting should not be
the controlling factor: under the PIK program, even a planted
crop must be turned under. Whether the crop was planted the
day before or was to be planted the day after is purely fortuitous.
The net result is the same in both cases. Since the program is
designed to create a substitute for noncrops in either case, the
crop lender's right should be the same.
We should add that we have no trouble with the bankruptcyordained result on the specific facts of Kruse. The debtor had
no right to anything before bankruptcy, since he had neither
70
planted any crops nor enrolled in any government programs.
The creditor is no worse off than if the farmer, instead of
signing up for PIK, had simply planted after filing bankruptcy.
Any creditor who relies on after-acquired collateral or other
future property runs the risk that the property may never come
into existence or may come into existence only after bankruptcy.
The problem with Kruse is the restriction it seems to place
on a creditor's rights. A farm lender who looks to crops as
security, even in cases where the crop does not come into existence, ought to be allowed to claim property which is understood
by everyone to be a specific substitute for those lost crops and
whose existence is the very reason the crops do not exist. And
this should be the case whether the security agreement happens
to mention "general intangibles" and whether the lost crop was
371
planted prior to entering the program.
2.

Effect of Federal Regulations Requiring Assignment

Most rights under government subsidy programs are expressly assignable. For this reason, there is no conceptual or
statutory difficulty in allowing transfer of these rights to a
110
See
"I

35 Bankr. at 966.

Of course, the lender won't always win. In In re Barton, 37 Bankr. 545 (Bankr.

E.D. Wash. 1984), the lender was held not to reach PIK entitlements because the original
security agreement intentionally omitted any reference to crops or other farm-based
collateral. The court held the lender simply did not intend to reach PIK entitlements or

other farm-related assets. See id. at 547. In In re Schmidt, 38 Bankr. 380 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1984), a creditor who had taken farm equipment and other farm assets as collateral was
held not entitled to PIK because the security agreement mentioned neither crops nor
general intangibles. See id. at 383.
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secured party. However, most of these rights exist under regulations which require that the assignment be made on a special
form and filed in the local ASCS office . 3a In several of the
cases discussed above, the party opposing the secured creditor
argued that the farmer's failure to make the assignment on the
proper form invalidated the creditor's right to reach the pay-

ments .

3 3

The courts have uniformly rejected this argument. For example, the court in Nivens noted that a security interest is not
an absolute assignment. The court read the regulation to require
the proper form only when there is an absolute assignment.374
The court further noted that the whole purpose of using and
filing these special forms is to make sure the government does
not pay the wrong party. 375 Until the form is filed, the government need not recognize the assignment by paying the creditor
directly. 376 However, nothing in the regulations suggests that
price support funds cannot be used as collateral for crop loans. 377
Thus, it seems that the crop lender need not worry about filling
out and filing the proper government forms.
Nevertheless, using the proper forms may be advisable. If
the lender anticipates its debtor's participation in one of these
programs and takes a formal assignment of the proceeds, it
should be entitled to receive the payment directly from the
government. Being paid directly is clearly simpler than trying to
wrestle the money out of the hands of the insolvent farmer or
his trustee.
3. Bankruptcy Preference Issues
Payments under government price support programs are normally claimed by creditors through preexisting security agreements covering preexisting debts. If they are made during the
ninety-day prebankruptcy period, it is possible that they may be
preferential under Bankruptcy Code section 547. Under this

See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 770.6(e) (1984).
" See, e.g., In re Nivens, 22 Bankr. at 290-91; In re Sunberg, 729 F.2d at 563.
314 See 22 Bankr. at 291.
375See id.
3,2

376See

id.

I" See id. For other cases agreeing with this approach, see In re Sunberg, 729 F.2d
at 563; In re Kruse, 35 Bankr. at 964-65; In re Lee, 35 Bankr. at 666-67.
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section nearly all property acquired by the debtor within the
ninety-day period is presumptively preferential. 378
There is an exception for floating security interests "in inventory or a receivable or the proceeds of either." 379 For this
collateral, instead of invalidating all after-acquired property interests, the Bankruptcy Code adopts an improvement of position
test. There is a preference only if and to the extent that the
creditor improves his position during the ninety-day period.3 80
Under section 547(a), farm products, including crops, are "inventory" and are protected by this rule.381 Payments under price
support programs are also protected either as "proceeds" or as
"receivables. "38 2
If the farmer receives government payments within the ninetyday period and these payments are attached by the creditor's
security agreement, it seems obvious that the creditor's position
has improved and the payments would be vulnerable. In the two
cases where government payments or entitlements appeared during the ninety-day period, however, the creditors were allowed
to keep them. Each of these cases approached the problem
38 3
differently.
In Nivens, the preference problem was presented in the context of a cash payment program.38 4 Over $500,000 was owed to
two crop lenders at the time bankruptcy was filed, March 18,

The Bankruptcy Code provides that a transfer is not made until the debtor
acquires rights in the collateral. Unless new value is given, this means all after-acquired
property is acquired and transferred to the creditor pursuant to an antecedent debt. See
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (1982).
311 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (1982).
390For a general discussion of the operation of this provision see J. WHITE & R.
SutmaERs, supra note 39, at § 24-25.
17s

81 "

or lease ...

'Inventory' means ... farm products such as crops or livestock, held for sale
." 11 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1982).

11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(1), (3) provides in part:
(1) 'inventory' means personal property leased or furnished, held for
sale or lease, or to be furnished under a contract for sale or lease, or to
be furnished under a contract for service, raw materials, work in process,
or materials used or consumed in a business, including farm products such
as crops or livestock, held for sale or lease; ...
(3) 'receivable' means right to payment, whether or not such right
has been earned by performance. ...
"I Compare In re Nivens, 22 Bankr. 287, 293-94 with In re Beattie, 31 Bankr. 703,
714-15 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1983).
I" See text accompanying notes 318-25, 374-77 supra.
38
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1982.385 As of the ninetieth day before bankruptcy, December
18, 1981, no disaster or deficiency payments had been made.
Under the programs, the amounts due could not be determined
until after the end of the year because a nationwide average
annual price is used as the basis for calculation. The determination of this debtor's entitlement was made on January 27,
within ninety days of bankruptcy. Checks totalling $37,560.756
38
were then received, some before bankruptcy and some after.
Thus, it would seem that the checks received during the ninetyday prebankruptcy period were preferential. At the very least,
since the court held these payments were proceeds of the crops,
the payments should have been subjected to the improvementof-position calculus of section 547(c)(5). The trustee adopted the
latter approach and contended all of the payments improved the
387
creditor's position.
The court, however, using two separate theories, found no
preference. 3 8 First, the court noted that growing crops undergo
continuous change and increase in value constantly from planting
until harvest. While this undoubtedly improves the creditor's
position, it is not the sort of improvement condemned by section
547(c)(5). There is no new inventory, no "transfer" of property
to the creditor which could become preferential. 38 9 On this point
the court seems correct. The natural appreciation in value of a
3
single asset should not be a preference. 9
But the court did not stop with the increased value of the
crop. Instead, it also said the disaster and deficiency payments
"cannot be separated from the growing crops," ' 39' which seems
to equate these payments with the crops' natural increase. It
follows, the court reasoned, that the payments created no improvement of position. 392 This conclusion is questionable. Assets
may depreciate as well as appreciate; that is always the secured
creditor's risk. When the total crop production is lower than
expected, there is simply less collateral. Payments under the

3

22 Bankr. at 289.

See id. at 293.
3"See id.
11

311See id. at 293-94.

See id.
3 Accord J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 39, § 24, at 1010-11.
31122 Bankr. at 294.
392See

id.
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programs artificially increase the farmer's assets by taking the
place of crops which never grew or a natural appreciation in
value which never occurred. This payment is not a natural increase: it is a new asset. When it appears within ninety days of
bankruptcy, it is preferential and the crop lender's claim should
be tested for improvement of position.
The Nivens court also ruled that the debtor's rights under
the disaster and deficiency programs "had become fixed"3 93 prior
to the ninetieth day and, consequently, created no preference.
This ruling also seems suspect since both the determination of
the amount and the payments were made after the ninetieth day.
But the court focused on the overall context of the lending
agreement to stretch the time frame. The court said the parties
must have contemplated even before planting the possibility
"that a disaster might occur which could give rise to the right
to disaster payments or low yield payments, and that the final
price for the crop could fluctuate to less than the target price,
which would give rise to deficiency payments. ' 394 This analysis
is correct. Awareness of the overall context of subsidy programs
is the reason the creditor's interest attaches to these proceeds. 395
The court then pointed out that the precise amount of the
396
payments could not be determined until after the crop year.
This is also true. However, the court went on to say that the
rights to the disaster and deficiency payments became fixed prior
397
to the ninetieth day, and therefore there can be no preference.
This is not so obvious.
All floating lienors are aware of and insure against the risks
of future contingencies such as destruction of the collateral. In
fact, insurance may be provided for in the security agreement.
To a certain extent, this fixes in advance of any bankruptcy the
right to insurance proceeds. If the court's rationale is followed,
the fact that the amount of a loss is determined and the insurance
payment is made during the ninety-day prebankruptcy period
makes no difference. Such a result is absurd. The insurance
payout is clearly a transfer of property within the meaning of

Id.
Id. at 293.
I" See text accompanying notes 318-25 supra.
39 See 22 Bankr. at 293.
393
"9

39

See id.
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section 547.398 Farm disaster payments, therefore, should be
treated as transfers.
Another way around the preference problem was found in
In re Beattie.399 Under Bankruptcy Code section 547(c)(5), the
creditor's improvement of position is preferential only if it operates "to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured
claims." In Beattie, the FmHA held a security interest in a dairy
farmer's farm-related collateral, including crops. 4 ° Certain milk
assignment payments were made during the ninety-day prebankruptcy period, and the trustee attacked them as preferential
because they improved the FmHA's position.401 The court rejected this argument, however, because the assets the FmHA got
were encumbered by its own security interest. The court said,
"[Neither the debtors' estate nor any unsecured creditors had
any anticipation of receiving any part of these proceeds and,
thus, the debtors' estate has not been depleted and unsecured
' 42
creditors have not been denied any assets from the estate."
Other courts have also been willing to accept the idea that mere
substitution of new security for old does not create a preference
since the debtor's estate is not depleted.4 3
Following this rationale, insurance proceeds as well as subsidy payments to secured creditors may be free from attack.
Because subsidy payments are designed expressly to be substituted for crop shortages of various types, giving them to the
secured creditor does not prejudice unsecured creditors.
A potential preference issue also arose in Sunberg.4 During
the ninety-day prebankruptcy period, the debtor signed up and
was approved for the PIK program. As discussed above, the
court allowed the creditor to reach the PIK entitlements as afteracquired general intangibles. 4 5 These general intangibles would
seem to be covered by the definition of "receivables" in Bankruptcy Code section 547,406 so the improvement-of-position test
3- Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (1982) (defines "transfer" in extremely broad terms).

"1 31 Bankr. 703.

See id. at 705.
See id. at 714-15.

4
1

Id. at 714.

See, e.g., In re Cloyd, 23 Bankr. 51, 53 (E.D. Tenn. 1982).
- 729 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1984).
401 See text accompanying notes 251-54 supra.
- The definition of "receivable" is quoted in note 382 supra.
4
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is still the key. The court avoided this problem, however, by
focusing on the fact that the payments were made after bankruptcy. 407 This brings the case within section 552(b) instead of
section 547, and the creditor's interest is preserved.
Under the Nivens approach, the entitlements in Sunberg
could be said to have matured during the ninety-day period.
This would seem to raise the improvement-of-position question.
Even here, however, the estate is not depleted to the prejudice
of unsecured creditors, and under Beattie there is still no preference. Farm lenders who claim interests in price support proceeds, it seems, have little to fear from the bankruptcy trustee.
CONCLUSION

While America's farmers may benefit from the myriad federal price support programs, the position of their creditors is
not so clear. Creditors who lend to farmers against crops as
security expect, like other inventory lenders, to be paid from the
proceeds generated by production and sale of the inventory. In
times of financial crisis, the creditor also expects to turn to the
security. But the operation and complexity of price support
programs make the security tenuous in many cases. Much of the
problem is caused by inadequacies in the underlying commercial
law, particularly the Article Nine special rules for crop and other
farm security interests. We believe these special rules should be
removed.
We realize there is no gold at the end of the rainbow, and
that no amount of changes in Article Nine will solve all the
problems. But it would ease them. For example, one is presently
forced to analyze complex and strained arguments in order to
determine whether a commodity purchase cuts off the secured
creditor's rights. The answer ought to be based on the economic
and federal policies underlying the program; instead it turns on
such irrelevancies as whether the farmer owns his own storage
facilities. Simple corrective surgery to Code section 9-307(1)
would remedy this problem.
Greater awareness of the farm context and the policies of
the government programs could also lead to more sensible read-

,1, See 729 F.2d at 562.
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ings of security agreements and alleviate many problems which
arise in the direct payment programs, particularly regarding those
instances in which payment is made before the originally intended collateral comes into existence. Again, the creditor's rights
to these entitlements in the farmer's hands should be based on
the policies of the programs and the needs of the farm community - a community which includes creditors. The legal result
in cases where the farmer has not planted should not be different
from that in cases where the farmer has planted and then turns
the crop under. The approach of the Ohio cases, thus, seems
the soundest.
The suggestions made in this Article, we believe, would go
a long way toward simplifying the law dealing with farm secured
creditors and toward bringing that law into the twentieth century.

